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RULE UNDER SIEGE 
George Lee Flint, Jr. * 
The recent increase in litigation over the proper rule for judicial review of 
discretionary plan administrator decisions made for employee benefit plans 
indicates that few employers have realized the importance of the problem. 
Whether a court reviews an administrator's decision under the arbitrary and 
capricious rule or engages in de novo review is the heart of the success or 
failure of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 1 
The method of review chosen by the courts will determine the fairness by 
which a plan administrator administers an employee benefit plan. Unless the 
courts adopt the analysis set forth in this Article, ERISA, as interpreted by 
the courts, will become an employer-favoring statute rather than the statute 
Congress designed to protect the interests of employees. 
After explaining the problem currently facing plan administrators and em-
ployees, this Article investigates the meaning of the arbitrary and capricious 
rule in various circuits. Then, it examines the current dissatisfaction with 
the arbitrary and capricious rule. This Article reviews the origin of, and 
hence the policy behind, the arbitrary and capricious rule. Moreover, it 
traces the court's review of discretionary decisions for employee benefit 
plans under state common law and the Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act of 1947 (LMRA).2 This Article shows ERISA's break with the 
common law and the LMRA, the obvious intent of Congress to follow the 
trust rules modified appropriately for employee benefit plans, and the failure 
of the courts to recognize clearly the problem and to carry out Congress' 
intent. This Article asserts that the appropriate analysis permits the applica-
tion of the arbitrary and capricious standard to review only the decisions of 
disinterested plan administrators with proper motives and requires de novo 
review in all other situations, namely the case of the interested plan adminis-
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trator with proper motives and the case of demonstrated self-dealing or 
other improper motives of the plan administrator. This essential approach is 
designed only to protect the employee/beneficiary from the unscrupulous 
employer who maintains excessive control over the plan administrator. 
I. THE HYPOTHETICAL AND THE DILEMMA 
Suppose the president of a local corporation calls his lawyer and relates 
that his most promising employee quit to establish a competing business or 
join a competing firm. 3 This employee requested his considerable benefit 
immediately in a lump sum from an established corporate plan. Suppose 
further that the president desires to prevent a portion of the retirement fund 
from use in a competing business or to punish the former employee by with-
holding the money. The president asks how to prevent the payment. The 
typical response requires the plan administrator, a corporate employee, to 
resolve that, because plan benefits shall supplement retirement income after 
the retirement age, the plan shall retain all benefits until the respective em-
ployee reaches retirement age. The retirement plan generally would author-
ize such action by a plan administrator because most plans provide the 
administrator with discretion concerning payment of benefits4 and plan in-
terpretation. 5 A plan administrator would usually provide an exception for 
3. This situation tracks the facts of Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 
1985). See also Oster v. Barco Employees' Retirement Plan, 869 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(employee who voluntarily terminated his employment challenged the denial of lump sum 
payments). Presumably, Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) attorneys repre-
senting several small businesses have faced similar situations sometime in their careers. 
4. Tax law once indirectly mandated discretion in benefit payment. The estate tax regu-
lations under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 2039(c) (Supp. 1983) (relating to an 
exemption from estate taxes for payments from qualified retirement plans other than lump 
sums), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2868 (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), defined a taxable lump sum to include an amount payable as a 
lump sum distribution at the election of the recipient. The income tax law under I.R.C. 
§ 402(a) (1980), amended to delete the availability language by the Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), 
included in taxable income those amounts paid or made available by a retirement plan. Writ-
ers of retirement plans retained flexibility concerning estate and income taxes by giving the 
plan administrator the discretion upon request of the employee/beneficiary (1) to grant or 
deny a lump sum payment and (2) to determine the time of payment of benefits. 
ERISA defines a plan administrator as an entity with discretion in the administration of the 
plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1982). 
5. State law indirectly mandated discretion in plan interpretation. Several early deci-
sions by state courts held that, absent fraud, courts could not review a plan administrator's 
decision if the plan provided that the plan administrator had discretion to determine eligibility 
and other matters under the plan and that such decision was conclusive. See, e.g., McNevin v. 
Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610, 613, 53 N.Y.S. 98, 100 (App. Div. 1898), a.ff'd, 167 N.Y. 
609, 60 N.E. 1115 (1901); Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 229Mass. I, 8, 118 N.E. 348, 
351 (1918); see also Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 
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those benefits whose total value did not exceed some small specified amount 
because accounting for these small amounts and maintaining the terminated 
employee's address is not cost efficient.6 This procedure to withhold the em-
ployee's benefit payment might succeed if all prior benefit payments fell be-
low the specified sum of the exception. Thus the plan administrator would 
not be adopting a new policy but merely codifying an existing policy. The 
procedure might also succeed when large payments might adversely affect 
investments, such as forcing undervalued asset sales or incurring certificate 
of deposit early withdrawal penalties. 7 
Some uncertainty exists, however, regarding the circumstances under 
which a court would uphold the plan administrator's actions if challenged by 
the employee/beneficiary. 8 ERISA, the federal statute governing retirement 
plans, provides that the plan administrator's actions must meet the standard 
of a prudent man acting in like circumstances. 9 The courts, however, do not 
1304 (9th Cir. 1983) (interpretations must be sustained unless arbitrary or capricious). With-
out that provision, courts applied the usual contract construction rule, which requires that 
courts construe the contract against the employer/draftsman. See, e.g., Menke v. Thompson, 
140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944); Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E. 2d 
878 (1937). Writers of retirement plans could avoid problems of poor draftsmanship by pro-
viding the plan administrator with the discretion to interpret the plan and determine any con-
troversy between the plan and the employee/beneficiary. 
6. The Internal Revenue Code specifically permits a defined benefit plan to provide im-
mediate payment in a lump sum (rather than in the required qualified joint and survivor annu-
ity) for amounts with a present value (of the annuity) that does not exceed $3,500. I.R.C. 
§§ 4ll(a)(7)(B), 417(e) (1988). The legislative history of these sections explained that the 
cash-out provision reduced the administrative costs of small annuity payments. H.R. CONF. 
REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 272 ("A cash-out could be made from the plan ... based 
on the reasonable administrative needs of the plan, and, in any event, not in excess of $1,750 
(with respect to the value of the benefit attributable to the employer's contributions)."), re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5054 (hereinafter H.R . CONF. REP. 
No. 1280]. 
7. See Denton, 765 F.2d at 1298. In Denton, the court gave both of these reasons for 
upholding the plan administrators' denial of immediate payment of a large Jump sum. Id. 
8. An employee/beneficiary may bring one of four different actions: (1) to obtain re-
quired information; (2) to recover benefits due under the terms of the plan; (3) to enjoin viola-
tions of ERISA; and (4) for equitable relief concerning the other actions. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(a)(l), (2) (1982). This Article focuses upon the second action. 
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l) states: 
Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 1344 of this title, a fiduciary shall 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants 
and beneficiaries and-
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; 
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then pre-
vailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters 
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; 
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use this standard when the challenged act involves plan administrator discre-
tion concerning benefit denial and plan interpretation. 10 Instead they apply 
the arbitrary and capricious review standard. 11 Under this standard, a court 
will not overturn the plan administrator's action if the administrator's docu-
mentation reasonably supports his position. 12 
A. The Issue: What Standard of Review Applies 
The United States Supreme Court recently delivered its first opinion con-
cerning the ERISA arbitrary and capricious rule. 13 The Court, however, 
limited its opinion to plans that fail to grant the plan administrator discre-
tion to determine eligibility or to interpret the plan. Most plans do provide 
for, 14 or soon will provide for, administrator discretion. 15 Therefore, a ques-
!d. 
(C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large 
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and 
(D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar 
as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this sub-
chapter or subchapter III of this chapter [Titles I and IV of ERISA]. 
10. See generally Comment, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ERISA: 
An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 986, 988 (1986). 
Several early commentators on the ERISA prudent man rule applied it only in connection with 
investments. See, e.g., Little & Thrailkill, Fiduciaries Under ERISA: A Narrow Path to Tread, 
30 VAND. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1977). Others, however, realized the rule covered all fiduciary 
actions. See, e.g., Dondanville, The Pension Reform Act: The Civil Liability View, 43 INS. 
COUNS. J. 556, 560 (1976). 
11. The arbitrary and capricious review standard appears nowhere within ERISA. See, 
e.g., Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp., 456 F. Supp. 559, 567 (N.D. Ohio 1978) ("This pre-ERISA 
test of judicial review [the arbitrary and capricious rule] is not implicitly approved or rejected 
by any part of ERISA."). 
12. The plan administrators in Denton prevented the former senior vice-president from 
receiving his immediate lump sum distribution (which exceeded any prior payment) when he 
began working as the vice-president of a bank in the same area (taking some banking clients 
with him), although they had paid every prior terminated employee in lump sum. Denton v. 
First Nat'! Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1297-98 (5th Cir. 1985). The administrators had an actuary 
report stating that such a large sum in this case would jeopardize the financial soundness of the 
defined benefit plan. The financial soundness of the plan, however, was jeopardized by the 
bank/sponsor who chose to fund the benefit of an aging employee beyond his retirement age, 
permitted by subsection 412(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the I.R.C. (for past service liability, over a 30-year 
period), and not by the employee who had no involvement in determining how the bank/ 
sponsor would fund the plan. Moreover, the bank/ sponsor may contribute any amounts nec-
essary to make the plan financially sound at any time without incurring a tax. I.R.C. 
§§ 404(a)(l)(A)(i), 412(a) (1988). 
13. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989). 
14. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
15. The plan in Firestone failed to grant the plan administrator discretion because the 
employer was unaware that ERISA applied to the plan. The employer then unsuccessfully 
contended that Congress, through ERISA, granted that discretion. Brief for Petitioners at 10, 
Firestone (No. 87-1054). 
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tion remains regarding the rule that applies to review of plan administrator 
discretionary decisions. 
B. The Background of Employee Benefit Plans 
1. The Players 
ERISA generally applies to employee benefit plans, of which there are two 
types: welfare plans and retirement plans. 16 Normally, an employee benefit 
plan contains at least a plan and a trust, which govern the benefit plan. 17 
This Article, however, treats both the plan and the trust as a unit. 18 Retire-
ment plans consist of two types: (1) defined contribution plans, where the 
documents define the annual contribution; and (2) defined benefit plans, 
where the documents define the retirement benefit so that an actuary must 
determine the annual contribution. 19 The plan's past experience, based on 
claims payments, will affect the contribution to both welfare plans and de-
fined benefit plans. 
Employee benefit plans generally involve four parties: (1) the employer, 
who makes the contributions to the plan; (2) the plan administrator, who 
administers the plan; (3) the trustee, who invests the plan's funds; and (4) 
the employee/beneficiary, who receives the benefits.20 A single party may 
serve in more than one of these four roles. Plan administrators usually in-
volve four types: (1) the employer;21 (2) a management employee, a commit-
tee of such persons, or a committee dominated by such persons;22 (3) a 
service provider, such as an insurance company operating under an adminis-
trative contract with the plan;23 or (4) a committee of equal numbers of 
16. 29 u.s.c. § 1002(2), (3) (1982). 
17. Id. § 1103(a). 
18. Cj S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 95 n.2 (1973) ("the term 'trust' ... means 
plan, whether or not in trust form"), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
4890, 4978 n.2. 
19. 29 u.s.c. § 1002(34)-(35) (1982). 
20. See generally Frei & Archer, Taxation & Regulation of Pension Plans Under the 
I R. C, 1967 U. ILL L.F. 691 , 692-93 (discussing the four parties in the context of their role in 
pension plans and the relevant tax consequences). 
21. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(ii)(B) (1982). 
22. See, e.g., Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 812-13 (6th Cir. 1987) (committee of execu-
tive employees); Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 620 (lith Cir. 1987) 
(director of personnel); Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 
797 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1986) (committee of management employees), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1094 (1987); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1985) (director of 
personnel). 
23. See, e.g., Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D.D.C. 1980) (service provider 
acting as claims administrator could be a fiduciary if it had ultimate responsibility for claims 
determinations). 
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representatives from management and from the rank and file employees. 24 
Generally, a plan administrator and a trustee are fiduciaries of a plan to 
whom ERISA's fiduciary standards apply.25 
2. The Governing Law 
The Federal Government left regulation of employee benefit plans to state 
common law until Congress passed the LMRA, 26 which established require-
ments for union-negotiated plans. Under the LMRA, both employers and 
employees contribute funds to employee representatives. These funds are 
then held in trust for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees and the 
basis of benefit payments must be included in a written plan. Additionally, 
an equal number of employer and employee representatives must administer 
the plan with an impartial umpire deciding deadlocked matters.27 
In disputes involving United Mine Workers' plans,28 federal courts began 
asserting jurisdiction over plan administrator actions involving union-negoti-
ated plans. Consequently, courts developed the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review. Upon disclosure of abuses in the administration and 
investment of employee benefit plan assets, Congress passed the Welfare and 
Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958 (WPPDA), 29 the first piece of legisla: 
tion to attempt protection of employee/beneficiary benefits in all plans. 
Under WPPDA, Congress, believing that mere disclosure would permit em-
ployee/beneficiaries to police their own plans, required only dissemination of 
a summary annual report to employees upon written request. 30 The inade-
quacies of WPPDA, however, 1ed to the passage of ERISA, which provides 
standards for vested benefit preservation, funding adequacy, investment se-
curity, and fiduciary conduct, 31 including a conduct standard for plan ad-
ministrators. ERISA did not repeal the LMRA provisions. 32 
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). 
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16), (21)(A) (1982). 
26. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 (LMRA), ch. 120, § I, 61 
Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982)). 
27. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). 
28. See Kennet v. United Mine Workers, 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960); Ruth v. Lewis, 
166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958); Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958); Barlow v. 
Roche, 161 A.2d 58 (D.C. 1960). See also infra notes 133-52 and accompanying text. 
29. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997, 1002 (1958), repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-406, 
§ lll(a)(l), 88 Stat. 851 (1974). 
30. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4642 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 533] . 
31. /d. at 5-8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4643-46. 
32. The only portion of the prior labor laws relating to retirement plans that Congress 
repealed by ERISA section 444, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982), was the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act of 1958 (WPPDA), leaving intact the LMRA provision, 29 U.S.C. § 186 
(1982). 
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Congress also directed the courts33 to fashion a federal common law relat-
ing to rights and obligations under employee benefit plans. 34 Under this di-
rective, the federal circuit courts, until recently, continued to use the LMRA 
arbitrary and capricious rule rather than the ERISA standards to review 
plan administrator discretionary decisions concerning plan interpretation 
and denial of benefits (which usually involves plan interpretation).35 
II. THE MEANING OF THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS RULE 
Whatever the arbitrary and capricious rule may mean, it definitely favors 
a plan administrator when an employee/beneficiary challenges a plan admin-
istrator's discretionary act. The circuit courts have generally held that the 
rule defers to the plan administrator. 36 However, Congress intended ERISA 
33. Although ERISA preempts state law that otherwise would apply to employee benefit 
plans, jurisdiction for employee/beneficiary lawsuits to recover benefits lies with both state and 
federal district courts. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1982). For exceptions to ERISA's preemption 
power, see id. § 1144. 
34. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 6, at 302 ("The conferees expect that the 
courts will interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind 
the special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans."), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5083. See also 120 CONG. REC. S29,942 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) 
(statement of Sen. Javits) ("A body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts 
to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."); 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1989) (same); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. 
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 55-57 (1987) (The courts are to develop a "federal common law of 
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. I, 24, n.26 (1983) (adopting Sen. Javits' statement); 120 
CONG. REC. S29,933 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) (Suits involving 
claims for benefits "will be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States, in similar 
fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. "), re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5188. 
35. See generally Comment, supra note 10, at 988-98 (tracing the courts' inconsistency in 
applying the arbitrary and capricious test); Comment, The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
Under ERISA: Its Origins and Application, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1033, 1035-41 (1985) (discussing 
evolution of the arbitrary and capricious standard); Gilbert, The Responsibilities and Disabili-
ties of Fiduciaries Under ERISA- A Ten-Year Anniversary Review, 43 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. 
TAX'N 33-1 , 33-16 to -22 (1985) (discussing proper standard of review of benefit claim denial). 
36. See, e.g., Dellacava v. Painters Pension Fund, 851 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1988) ("very 
deferential"); Skelton v. Lowen, 850 F.2d 200, 201 (4th Cir. 1988) ("great deference"); Sim-
mons v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 844 F.2d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying deferential 
standard even where plan is ambiguous); Haeffele v. Hercules Inc., 839 F.2d 952, 957 (3d Cir. 
1988) ("more deferential"); Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir.) (rejecting de 
novo review), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 76 (1988); Shull v. State Mach. Co. Employees Profit 
Sharing Plan, 836 F.2d 306, 307 (7th Cir. 1987) ("highly deferential"); Bruch v. Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987), a.ff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 948 
(1989); Fielding v. International Harvester Co., 815 F.2d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 1987); Denton 
v. First Nat'! Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985) ("deference . .. is absolutely neces-
sary"); Anderson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 759 F.2d 1518, 1522 (lith Cir.) ("highly deferential"), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985); Teamster's Local 348 Health & Welfare Fund v. Kohn 
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to promote the interests of employee/beneficiaries. 37 Thus, the favoritism 
shown to plan administrators by the courts seems contrary to Congress' 
purpose. 
A. The Three Principles of Deference 
The deference that courts have chosen to extend to plan administrators 
has manifested itself in three ways. First, courts will not permit de novo 
review of a plan administrator's discretionary action under the arbitrary and 
capricious rule. 38 Courts limit the review of a plan administrator's discre-
tionary decision to those matters and documentation brought to the adminis-
trator by the employee/beneficiary and others before the administrator made 
Beverage Co., 749 F.2d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 1984) (reversing district court's de novo review and 
applying deferential standard), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 
748 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1984) ("this deferential standard"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). 
See also Mandel, Must Claims Denials Be Upheld Under Arbitrary and Capricious-What 
Standard of Review Applies to Group Insurance Policies Issued to ERISA Plans?, 19 FORUM 
457 (1984) (suggesting insurance companies convert state insurance contract cases into federal 
ERISA claims to take advantage of the rule). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982) states: 
[T]hat owing to the lack of . .. adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is 
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries ... that ... safeguards 
be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such 
plans . . . it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries 
... that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such 
plans .... 
/d. See also Firestone, 109 S. Ct. at 955; Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 89-91 
(1983). 
38. See, e.g., Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 145 (1988); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 
1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987) (The court is sympathetic to a challenge to the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard, calling it "too lax in some pension cases and too stringent in others .. .. "); 
Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 822 F.2d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 1987) ("While plaintiffs 
argue for more of a de novo standard, this approach has been rejected in favor of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard . .. . ");Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton Retirement 
Plan, 797 F.2d 521, 532 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987); Crews v. Central 
States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 788 F.2d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 1986); Weir v. Anaconda 
Co., 773 F .2d 1073, 1076 (lOth Cir. 1985); Denton, 765 F.2d at 1304 ("In reviewing a decision 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the trial court must focus on the evidence that 
was before the Plan [administrator] when the final benefit determination was made."); LeFebre 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 747 F.2d 197, 208 (4th Cir. 1984) ("The scope of review is nar-
row .. . , a trustee's decision is not to be disturbed unless it is arbitrary and capricious ... . "); 
Offutt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 735 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[T]he reviewing 
court may not hold a de novo hearing on the question .. . . "); Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., 710 
F.2d 388, 394 (7th Cir. 1983); Wardle v. Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 
627 F.2d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). But see Redmond v. 
Burlington N. R. Co. Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 461 , 465 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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a decision. 39 If a trial judge considers other matters and documentation not 
put before the plan administrator at the time the administrator made a deci-
sion, then an appellate court will reverse the trial court.40 Thus, a plan ad-
ministrator need not concern himself with exhausting all possibilities or 
locating additional information that might favor the employee/beneficiary 
because courts will only review the administrator's decision based on the 
documentation the administrator had before him at the time of the 
decision.41 
Second, although most circuits hold that a plan administrator needs sub-
stantial evidence to support his decision, 42 the decision need not amount to a 
39. ERISA provides that the plan administrator must have a procedure for making a 
claim, communicating the denial to the employee/beneficiary, and appealing the decision for 
reconsideration. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1988). Only after exhaust-
ing this procedure may the employee/beneficiary bring his claim denial before a court for 
review. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 254 
(7th Cir. 1983). 
40. Voliva v. Seafarers Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1988) (trial court re-
versed when it went outside of the administrative record to find against plan administrator). 
See Daniel, 839 F.2d at 266; Denton, 765 F.2d at 1304; Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 
1003, 1007 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The trial court erred ... in admitting into evidence matters not 
before the plan administrator."); LeFebre, 747 F.2d at 204; Miles v. New York State Teamsters 
Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir.) (trial court reversed 
when it conducted de novo review), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983). 
41. In Wolfe, 710 F.2d at 394, the circuit court reversed and remanded the case to the 
district court. The circuit court instructed the district court to remand to the fiduciary to 
consider the new evidence. /d. At trial, the district court had considered this evidence in 
contravention of the general rule against de novo hearings. /d. 
42. See Naugle v. O'Connell, 833 F.2d 1391, 1393-94 (lOth Cir. 1987) (basing arbitrary 
and capricious rule on substantial evidence or error of law); Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 
1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (limiting judicial review of trustee's decision to bad faith or arbi-
trary and capricious standard which encompasses evidence or legal error); Stanton v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 434 (4th Cir. 1986) (limiting judicial review to bad faith actions or arbi-
trary and capricious standard which requires substantial evidence); Berry, 761 F.2d at 1007 
(same); Jestings v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 757 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1985) (considerable 
evidence); Vorpahl v. Retirement Plan for Employees of Union Oil Co., 749 F.2d 1266, 1268 
(8th Cir. 1984); LeFebre, 747 F.2d at 204 (arbitrary and capricious standard determined by 
support of substantial evidence); Ganze v. Dart Indus., Inc., 741 F.2d 790, 793 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(noting previous approval of substantial evidence or legal error standards); District 17, Dist. 
29, Local Union 7113, & Local Union 6023 v. Allied Corp., 735 F.2d 121, 133 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(substantial evidence must support trustee's decision); Wolfe, 710 F.2d at 393 (court should 
overturn trustee's decision where arbitrary and capricious, lacks substantial evidence or con-
tains an error of law); Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(requiring substantial evidence or legal error for judicial review); Hom v. Mullins, 650 F.2d 
35, 37 (4th Cir. 1981) (same); Wardle, 627 F.2d at 824 (substantial evidence). 
Although the Sixth and Ninth Circuits do not interpret arbitrary and capricious as encom-
passing support by substantial evidence, those circuits do recognize lack of support by substan-
tial evidence as an additional ground for overturning the decision of a plan administrator. See 
Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1987); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 
534 (9th Cir. 1986); Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1986); 
142 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 39:133 
preponderance of the evidence.43 Thus, to avoid reversal, a plan administra-
tor need only maintain good documentation concerning the reasons and 
thoughts behind the decision. 
Third, a plan administrator must only demonstrate a rational reason for 
his decision.44 Consequently, even if the reviewing court would have de-
Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. and S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 794 F.2d 
221, 232 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long 
Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1986); Blakeman v. Mead Containers, 
779 F.2d 1146, 1149 (6th Cir. 1985); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th 
Cir. 1985); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1985); Teamster's Local 348 
Health & Welfare Fund v. Kohn Beverage Co., 749 F.2d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Hum v. Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing, Heating and Piping 
Indus., 703 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1983); Fentron Indus. Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension 
Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982). Frequently, the Tenth Circuit adopts a position 
similar to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. See Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan and Trust, 
845 F.2d 885, 895 (lOth Cir. 1988); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 
719 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir.), op. supp., 724 F.2d 100 (lOth Cir. 1983); Peckham v. Board of 
Trustees of Int'l Bhd. of Painters, 653 F.2d 424, 426 (lOth Cir. 1981). 
The Eighth Circuit has suggested that less than substantial evidence suffices to uphold the 
plan administrator's decision. See Severs v. Allied Constr. Servs., Inc., 795 F.2d 649, 650 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (requires evidence supporting decision); Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 780 F.2d 1321, 
1323 (8th Cir. 1986) (some evidence); Torimino v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l 
Union Indus. Pension Fund, 712 F.2d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (adequate evi-
dence). 
The Fifth Circuit has stated specifically that the substantial evidence requirement is a sepa-
rate ground from arbitrary and capricious and has refused to require substantial evidence. 
Offutt, 735 F.2d at 950. 
In Brown, 797 F.2d at 526-27, the court rejected the argument that a meaningful review of a 
plan administrator's decision was difficult because virtually some evidence always exists to 
justify the plan administrator's decision. While the court labeled this argument a misinterpre-
tation, statements of other circuits suggest the same conclusion. However, the Seventh Circuit 
stated specifically that some evidence was not sufficient because the arbitrary and capricious 
rule required substantial evidence. /d. 
43. See Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985). This is the 
court's understanding in an LMRA case. See also Tomlin v. Board of Trustees of Constr. 
Laborers Pension Trust, 586 F.2d 148, 151 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Substantial evidence] consists of 
more than a scintilla but somewhat less than a preponderance of evidence."); Kennet v. United 
Mine Workers, 183 F. Supp. 315, 318 (D.D.C. 1960) (adopting the substantial evidence re-
quirement for the arbitrary and capricious rule). The employee/beneficiary, however, does 
have to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence under the arbitrary and capricious 
rule. See Bova v. American Cyanamid Co., 662 F. Supp. 483, 492 (S.D. Ohio 1987); Adam v. 
Joy Mfg. Co., 651 F. Supp. 1301, 1307 (D.N.H. 1987). 
44. The circuit courts have held as follows: Bachelder v. Communications Satellite Corp., 
837 F.2d 519, 521 (1st Cir. 1988) (where both parties offer rational but conflicting plan inter-
pretations, one trustee's interpretation will control); Jestings, 757 F.2d at 9 (same); Govoni v. 
Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Int'l Union, Local No. 5 Pension Fund, 732 F.2d 250, 252 
(1st Cir. 1984) (same); Miles, 698 F.2d at 599 (courts should not disregard a plan committee's 
reasonable interpretation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Shiffler v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y of the United States, 838 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1988) (trustee's interpretation cannot 
be said to violate fiduciary duty unless it is arbitrary and capricious); Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre 
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cided the claim differently, a plan administrator's decision will stand, absent 
irrationality.45 Thus plan administrators must only develop some reasonable 
ground for their discretionary decisions. Only after the employee/benefici-
ary makes a prima facie showing of unreasonable action does the plan ad-
ministrator have the burden of showing some rational basis for the action 
taken.46 
Publishing Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985); 
Wolfv. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); Skelton v. 
Lowen, 850 F.2d 200, 201 (4th Cir. 1988) (trustee's determination can be overruled only if 
arbitrary and capricious); Witmeyer v. Kilroy, 788 F.2d 1021, 1025 (4th Cir. 1986) (same); 
Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1985) (same), cert. denied, 
477 U.S. 903, aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus. , Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Thomp-
son v. Asbestos Workers Local No. 53 Pension Fund, 716 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(courts defer to a trustee's reasonable interpretation); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 816 (6th 
Cir. 1987) (a case will be remanded only if the record is so inadequate that the trustee's moti-
vation is not determinable); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employee's Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 
1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 1987) (arbitrary and capricious contemplates a standard of total unrea-
sonableness); Shull v. State Mach. Co., Employees Profit Sharing Plan, 836 F.2d 306, 308 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (where denial of a claim is based on a reasonable interpretation, it will not be set 
aside); Brown, 797 F.2d at 529 (same); Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., Inc., 712 F.2d 1209, 1211 
(7th Cir. 1983) (same); Simmons v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 844 F.2d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 
1988) (court will adhere to an arbitrary and capricious standard); Atkinson v. Sheet Metal 
Workers' Trust Funds, 833 F.2d 864, 865 (9th Cir. 1987) (arbitrary and capricious standard 
means any reasonable resolution by the trustees of an ambiguity will be upheld); Bance v. 
Alaska Carpenters Retirement Plan, 829 F.2d 820, 822 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); McDaniel v. 
National Shopmen Pension Fund, 817 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir.) (same), vacated, appeal dis-
missed, 820 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1987); Fielding v. International Harvester Co., 815 F.2d 1254, 
1256 (9th Cir. 1987) (same); Dockray, 801 F.2d at 1152 (same); Hancock, 787 F.2d at 1308 
(same); Ellenburg, 763 F.2d at 1096 (same); Jung, 755 F.2d at 713 (same); Music v. Western 
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 712 F.2d 413, 419 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Harm 
v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(same); Gordon v. ILWU-PMA Benefit Funds, 616 F.2d 433, 439-40 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). 
See also Pokratz, 771 F.2d at 209 (a decision is not arbitrary and capricious when a court can 
read the plan administrator's reason without a loud guffaw). 
45. See Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir. 1987) (court may 
not substitute its own judgment); Schwartz v. Newsweek, Inc. , 827 F.2d 879, 883 (2d Cir. 
1987); Deak v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572, 577 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988); Stewart v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 795 F.2d 1079, 
1083 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Blakeman, 779 F.2d at 1150 (court may not substitute its own judg-
ment); Denton v. First Nat') Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985) (no second guessing by 
the trial court); Gaines v. Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 753 F.2d 288, 289 (3d Cir. 1985); Ganze, 
741 F.2d at 793; Miles, 698 F.2d at 599; Elser v. I.A.M. Nat') Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648, 654 
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 813 (1983); Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314. 
46. Mosley v. National Maritime Union Pension & Welfare Plan, 451 F. Supp. 226 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (ERISA) (requiring plaintiff to show trustee's actions were beyond their pow-
ers and inconsistent with the intended purpose of the plan); see also Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 
425, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (LMRA) (holding that plaintiff must produce enough evidence so 
that court may measure trustee's actions against existing standards of arbitrary and capricious 
conduct). 
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B. Policy Reasons for Applying the Arbitrary and Capricious Rule 
In the early cases, the circuit courts seldom discussed or elaborated on the 
policy reasons for applying the arbitrary and capricious rule to ERISA 
cases. Rather, the courts assumed that the rule from the LMRA cases ap-
plied in ERISA disputes. Only after employing the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review did judges begin to explore the validity of the result. By 
later supplying reasons, the courts implied that they recognized problems 
with the rule for a non-union-negotiated ERISA plan.47 Several circuit 
courts noted that the arbitrary and capricious rule "strikes a bal~nce be-
tween excessive judicial intervention in the discharge of trustees' duties, on 
the one hand, and abdication of traditional judicial control of fiduciaries' 
actions, on the other."48 These courts provided no reasons explaining their 
desire for this balance for a plan subject to ERISA. The reason for the ab-
sence lies with the source cited for the balance idea,49 which deals with a 
union-negotiated pension plan in the pre-ERISA situation. The originating 
court noted that the arbitrary and capricious rule, in striking the balance 
between excessive judicial intervention and abdication of traditional judicial 
47. See, e.g., Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1052 (courts borrowed the LMRA rule "apparently 
without the courts' noticing that employers often held the whip hand in ERISA trusts," and 
that "[t]ransposed to the ERISA setting, the arbitrary and capricious standard may be inapt, a 
historical mistake, or a mechanical extrapolation from different settings"); Shull, 836 F.2d at 
307 (there is "a growing restiveness in cases where the trustees seem not to be true neutrals in 
the disputes they are calJed on to resolve"); Varhola, 820 F.2d at 813 ("[w]ere we writing on a 
clean slate, we might welJ be persuaded that [a] stricter standard of review should apply"). 
48. Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984) (using the rule to uphold a 
policy in the nature of a prohibited badboy provision when dealing with a plan administrator's 
denial of the acceleration of benefits to an employee who quit, taking business to a competitor). 
See also Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 
1979) (use of rule to uphold policy suspending benefits to retiree who returns to type of em-
ployment for which benefits were originalJy granted); Brown, 797 F.2d at 526 (use of rule to 
uphold denial of disability benefits by plan administrators implementing pension plan defini-
tion of disability). 
Other circuit courts, when using this balance as a reason for the rule, only mention the 
excessive judicial intervention portion. See Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 76 (1988); Cook v. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 801 F.2d 
865, 870 (6th Cir. 1986); Dennard, 681 F.2d at 313; Ganze, 741 F.2d at 793; Offutt v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America, 735 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1984); Miles, 698 F.2d at 599. See also 
Bueneman v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 
1978) (noting that court intervention in trustee's decisions is limited). This shortened version 
defers to congressional intent to provide that judicial control. See, e.g. , H.R. REP. No. 533, 
supra note 30, at 12 ("[E]ven assuming that the law of trusts is applicable, without .. . access 
to the courts, and without standards by which a participant can measure the fiduciary's con-
duct he is not equipped to safeguard either his own rights or the plan assets."), reprinted in 
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4650. 
49. Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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control, was consistent with federal labor policy.5° Federal labor policy re-
quires the joint labor-management administration of union plans under the 
LMRA and the arbitration process to resolve disputes in lieu of continual 
lawsuits.51 Thus, because the usual labor-management administrative con-
trol and dispute mechanisms are unavailable for a non-union-negotiated ER-
ISA plan, it is highly questionable whether the policy reason applicable to a 
union-negotiated plan under the LMRA should also apply to a non-union-
negotiated ERISA plan. 
Furthermore, when Congress enacted ERISA, it sought to "codifly] and 
[make] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the 
evolution of the law of trusts."52 Under the law of trusts, the judiciary 
maintained strict control over the fiduciary. 53 When courts refused to exer-
cise this supervisory role in ERISA cases, that is, when they abdicated the 
traditional judicial control of fiduciaries' actions, they apparently acted in a 
manner contrary to the underlying purpose of Congress in enacting ERISA. 
Nonetheless, some circuit courts have attempted to provide some obviously 
erroneous reasons for the refusal to intervene. First, courts have asserted 
their desire to defer to others with the intelligence54 or experience55 to oper-
50. Id. 
51. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (courts 
are to defer to private settlement of labor disputes); International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. 
Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 246 (1971) ("[a] stricter standard ... would be inconsistent with the 
apparent congressional intent to allow unions to govern their own affairs"). 
52. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 30, at 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4649. See also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 954 
(1989); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 
559, 570 (1985). 
53. See infra note 165 and accompanying text. 
54. Stewart v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 795 F.2d 1079, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(application of the arbitrary and capricious rule to ERISA plans is analogous to application of 
the same rule in administrative law: to take into account the expertise of a professional operat-
ing in a complex field); Elser v. I.A.M. Nat'! Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(presumed expertise of the administrators), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 813 (1983). 
A plan administrator frequently possesses the needed expertise only if he consults with 
someone else who possesses that expertise. In particular, plan administrators of small plans 
seldom have the opportunity to confront employee benefit plan problems and so must con-
stantly consult with accountants and lawyers to handle those problems. Plan administrators of 
large plans typically use lower echelon management employees, who must constantly consult 
with the corporate counsel concerning the numerous problems. Nothing prevents a court from 
consulting the same experts. 
Moreover, few, if any, plan administrators have the same degree of disinterest in the decision 
as a public administrative body. Plan administrators of non-union-negotiated plans are typi-
cally corporate employees or service providers hired solely as plan administrators. The jobs, 
compensation, or advancement of these individuals depend on retaining the employer's favor 
by keeping expenses of the plan low, including benefit payments. 
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ate in a field as complex as ERISA. These reasons, however, do not prevent 
the courts from handling antitrust and other complex cases. 56 
Second, some courts have refused to intervene because ERISA requires 
plan administrators to balance the interests of the various parties to the plan, 
including present beneficiaries and future beneficiaries, 57 and the payment of 
benefits while guarding the plan's financial security.58 However, only the 
lack of future employer contributions causes the administrator to guard zeal-
ously the plan's financial security, and ERISA requires the plan administra-
55. Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th Cir. 1985) (the rule insures that 
the decision will be made by those whose experience in such matters is daily and continual 
rather than by the court whose experience is episodic); see also Holland v. Burlington Indus., 
Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903, aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. 
Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986) (upholding rule in order to maintain consistent 
administration). 
Daily and continual experience, however, definitely does not reflect the case of smaii" plans 
that have few employee/beneficiaries and plans administered by or using some high manage-
ment official, such as the personnel director, as the plan administrator, who relies on under-
lings. Cf Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1985) (director of personnel 
processing retirement and benefit requests); Chilton v. Savannah Foods & Indus., 814 F.2d 620 
(11th Cir. 1987) (corporate board determining eligibility of subsidiary's retirees for pension 
plan). 
56. Federal court procedure provides for referral of complex matters to special masters, 
but not routinely and only (in actions tried without a jury) in matters of account and of diffi-
cult computation of damages. FED. R. CJv. P. 53. Federal courts will usually try an ERISA 
matter under the arbitrary and capricious rule without a jury. Brown v. Retirement Comm. of 
Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 
(1987); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 
1980); Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). Even in antitrust cases, the referral cannot be made 
routinely without a showing of the special need in that case. See, e.g. , Jack Walters & Sons 
Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 712 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). 
57. See Edwards v. Wilkes-Barre Publishing Co. Pension Trust, 757 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 843 (1985); Michota v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 755 F.2d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 
1985); Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Plan, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 
1984). See also Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir.) (overturning district 
court's granting of de novo review to avoid excessive judicial interference with trustee's admin-
istration of pension plans), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 76 (1988). 
Gayosh v. Lewis, 410 F.2d 262, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1969), which involved a pre-ERISA union-
negotiated plan and interpreted the purpose of the "solely and exclusive benefit" provision of 
section 302(c)(5) of LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982), provided the source for the second 
policy reason for refusing to intervene. See Elser, 684 F.2d at 656. Although section 302(c)(5) 
and ERISA share common language, it is not at all clear that the underlying purposes of the 
two statutes are the same. See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 30, at 4 ("[The LMRA] is not 
intended to establish nor does it provide standards for the preservation of vested benefits, fund-
ing adequacy, security of investment, or fiduciary conduct."), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4642. 
58. Michota, 755 F.2d at 336 (justifying application of arbitrary and capricious rule be-
cause trustees' conflicting obligations force them to avoid decisions that are irrational or con-
trary to the intent of pension plans). 
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tor to operate the plan "for the exclusive purpose . .. of providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries," not the employer.59 
Third, courts have correctly asserted that ERISA requires plan adminis-
trators to process claims. 60 However, part of the processing procedure man-
dated by ERISA includes a federal right of action for denied claims, which 
undermines the policy for applying the arbitrary and capricious rule.61 
The circuit courts, therefore, have not agreed upon a policy reason for the 
application of the arbitrary and capricious rule. Perhaps this results from a 
lack of clarity among the circuits regarding the real function of the rule. 
The various reasons set forth by the circuits suggest that the main problem is 
one of determining the plan administrator's role, which is compounded by 
the desire not to emasculate that role: Certain circumstances, however, may 
demand emasculation of the administrator's role and mandate use of some 
standard of review other than the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
C. Inconsistent Statements of the Arbitrary and Capricious Rule 
Not only are the various circuit courts unclear as to the public policy 
advanced by the arbitrary and capricious rule, they also vary as to exactly 
what constitutes arbitrary and capricious. More particularly, courts have 
not agreed on the circumstances required to overturn a plan administrator's 
discretionary decision. 62 This confusion is manifest in the terms used by the 
courts to refer to the arbitrary and capricious rule. The First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits predominantly quote the rule as merely 
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1982). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1982) (plan assets 
"shall never inure to the benefit of any employer"). Moreover, employers draft the plan, or, at 
least, agree to it. Therefore, they can avoid any problems by carefully drafting the plan. 
60. Denton v. First Nat') Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985) (Congress intended 
to give administrators primary responsibility for processing claims); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe 
Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F .2d 1301, 1304 n.3 (9th Cir. 1983) (trustees have dis-
cretion in administering plan). See also Daniel, 839 F.2d at 267 (efficient plan administration); 
Cook v. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 801 F.2d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 1986). 
61. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(1)(b) (1982). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1024(c) (1982); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2520.102-3(t)(7)(1)-(2) (1988) (dealing with the statement of ERISA rights that must be 
given to all participants). 
62. The Supreme Court referred to these inconsistencies as the reason for its first review of 
the rule. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1989). The Ninth Circuit 
has also admitted that the correct review standard is unclear in that circuit. Pilon v. Retire-
ment Plan for Salaried Employees of Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 861 F.2d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 
1988). Furthermore, commentators have noted this confusion. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 
35, at 33-19; Comment, supra note 10, at 995. Even with virtually the same facts, courts have 
reached different conclusions. Compare Wardle v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension 
Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980) (upholding district court's affirmance of trustee's denial of 
retirement benefits), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981) with Richardson v. Central States, S.E. 
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 645 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981) (affirming district court's reversal of 
trustee's denial of retirement benefits). 
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arbitrary and capricious. The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and District of Co-
lumbia Circuits also commonly cite the rule this way. The other circuits, 
however, sometimes add other items, which they may or may not deem 
equivalent to arbitrary and capricious.63 
The most commonly added item is a requirement of bad faith. 64 Because 
courts generally asserted bad faith as the sole ground for overturning a plan 
administrator's decision under pre-ERISA state law,65 courts generally con-
sider "bad faith" as being distinct from "arbitrary and capricious. " 66 The 
Eighth Circuit frequently adds the term "abuse of discretion" to its under-
standing of arbitrary and capricious. 67 The terms "abuse of discretion" and 
63. The circuit courts have occasionally indicated that the term "arbitrary and capri-
cious" encompasses a particular addition. See, e.g., Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 564, 
566 (8th Cir. 1988) (arbitrary and capricious violation includes an abuse of discretion); Hol-
land v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1985) (court refused to vary 
standard to include bad faith because arbitrary and capricious encompasses bad faith), cert. 
denied, 477 U.S. 903, aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986). 
64. Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 936 (7th Cir. 1989); Hansen v. Western 
Greyhound Retirement Plan, 859 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1988); MacDonald v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 859 F.2d 742, 744 (9th Cir. 1988); Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 
Co., 822 F.2d 623, 626 (6th Cir. 1987); Rhoton v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension 
Fund, 717 F.2d 988, 989 (6th Cir. 1983); Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. 
Central Transp., Inc., 698 F.2d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 472 U.S. 559 (1985); Miles v. 
New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 
911, 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Van Gunten v. Central States, S.E. & 
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 672 F.2d 586, 587 (6th Cir. 1982); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 145 (1988). See also 
Young v. Standard Oil, 849 F.2d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir.) (refusing to apply a bad faith test, 
depicted as a more stringent good faith test, in lieu of arbitrary and capricious standard), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 529 (1988); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 
1048, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that other courts add bad faith as an additional ground 
for overturning the plan administrator's decision); Holland, 772 F.2d at 1149. 
The bad faith addition is a remnant of the old pre-ERISA state law. See, e.g., McNevin v. 
Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div. 1898), aff'd, 167 N.Y. 609, 60 N.E. 
1115 (1901). The LMRA rule also encompassed the bad faith addition, see Danti v. Lewis, 
312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962), but was preempted by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982). 
65. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Romine, 536 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ 
n.r.e.). This is the contract rule for overturning a decision of a party charged with discretion, 
such as an architect in a construction contract. See Clark v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 229 
Mass. I, 9, 118 N.E. 348, 350 (1917). 
66. Smart, 868 F. 2d at 936; Van Boxe/, 836 F.2d at 1049-50; contra Holland, 772 F.2d at 
1149. 
67. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Anger, 784 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1986); Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 
780 F.2d 1321, 1322 (8th Cir. 1985); Central Hardware Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. 
Areas Pension Fund, 770 F.2d 106, 109 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); 
Torimino v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Indus. Pension Fund, 712 F.2d 
882, 883 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1982); Quinn v. Burlington 
N., Inc. Pension Plan, 664 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); 
Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981); Bueneman v. Central States, S.E. & 
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"arbitrary and capricious" both originated from trust law,68 therefore, 
courts generally consider them equal. 69 
Some courts also engraft the term "unsupported by substantial evidence" 
onto the definition of arbitrary and capricious. 70 Yet, "unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence" is equivalent to "arbitrary and capricious" in most cir-
cuits.71 Moreover, courts often add the phrase "erroneous with respect to a 
question of law,"72 which, in combination with "unsupported by substantial 
evidence," is equivalent to "arbitrary, capricious, or bad faith.' 173 
Some circuit courts add several of these terms to the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule. The predominant practice in the Tenth Circuit, for example, is to 
add both "unsupported by substantial evidence" and "erroneous with re-
spect to a question of law."74 Several courts supply other double combina-
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978). See also Hickman, 840 F.2d 
at 566 (cannot have an arbitrary and capricious violation without an abuse of discretion). 
68. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides the source of the "abuse of discretion" 
element. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). See Brune v. Morse, 475 F.2d 
858, 860 n.2 (8th Cir. 1973) (an LMRA case). Trust law also provides the source of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g. , Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958). 
See also infra notes 133-52 and accompanying text. 
69. See e.g. , Hickman, 840 F.2d at 566. 
70. District 17, Dist. 29, Local Union 711 3, and Local Union 6023 v. Allied Corp., 735 
F.2d 121, 133 (4th Cir. 1984); Short v. United Mine Workers 1950 Pension Trust, 728 F.2d 
528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also 
Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1050 (noting that some circuits add the term "unsupported by substan-
tial evidence" as an additional ground for overturning the plan administrator's decision). 
71. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
72. Bance v. Alaska Carpenters Retirement Plan, 829 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1987) (con-
trary to law); Budwig v. Natelson's, Inc. Profit Sharing Retirement Plan, 720 F.2d 977, 978 
(8th Cir. 1983) (inconsistent with ERISA), Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust 
Fund, 701 F.2d 1301 , 1304 (9th Cir. 1983); Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 
650, 654 (9th Cir. 1981) (contrary to law). 
The "arbitrary and capricious" rule, as applied under the LMRA, provides the source of the 
"erroneous with respect to a question of law" phrase. See Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 348 
(D.C. Cir. 1962). 
73. See Danti, 312 F.2d at 348. 
74. Torix v. Ball Corp., 862 F.2d 1428, 1429 (lOth Cir. 1988); Sage v. Automation, Inc. 
Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (lOth Cir. 1988); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of 
the Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades Union & Indus. Nat'! Pension Fund, 719 F.2d 1063, 
1066 (lOth Cir.), op. supp., 724 F.2d 100 (lOth Cir. 1983); Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the 
Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades Union & Indus. Nat') Pension Fund, 653 F.2d 424, 426 
(lOth Cir. 1983). 
This combination also appears in other circuits. See, e.g. , Brown v. Retirement Comm. of 
Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d 521 , 525 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1094 (1987); Whitworth Bros. Storage Co. v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 
794 F.2d 221,232 n.l5 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986); Hancock v. Montgomery 
Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1986); Ellenburg v. Brock-
way, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1985); Teamster's Local, 348 Health & Welfare Fund 
v. Kohn Beverage Co., 749 F.2d 315, 321 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); 
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tions such as: (1) "bad faith" and a version of "erroneous with respect to a 
question of law"/5 or (2) "bad faith" and "fraud."76 The Ninth Circuit 
commonly adds to the arbitrary and capricious standard some combination 
of the following: "unsupported by substantial evidence"; "erroneous with 
respect to a question of law"; and "bad faith.'m 
Because courts sometimes recognize the combining of additional elements 
as additional grounds for overturning the plan administrator's discretionary 
decisions, different courts have subjected the plan administrator's decisions 
to alternate types of review. 78 For the purposes of this Article, then, the 
arbitrary and capricious rule will encompass only the absence of de novo 
review, the substantial evidence requirement, and the reasonable explana-
tion. These elements represent those that came from the LMRA rule and 
the first judicial treatments of the arbitrary and capricious rule. 
D. Limits on the Applicability of the Rule 
Notwithstanding the various interpretations of what constitutes the arbi-
trary and capricious rule, some circuits have limited its use by restricting the 
situations under which a court will apply the rule or by adding lengthy con-
ditions for its application. For instance, the Third Circuit limits the applica-
tion of the rule to individual claims that involve balancing opposing 
beneficiaries' interests. 79 When legal actions involve the beneficiaries as a 
class against the interests of some third party, however, the Third Circuit 
will apply the ERISA statutory standards, namely the prudent man rule. 80 
Odom v. United Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds, 687 F.2d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 
1982). 
75. Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 267 (6th Cir.) (contrary to law), cert. denied, 109 
S. Ct. 76 (1988). 
76. Martinez v. Swift & Co., 656 F.2d 262, 263 (7th Cir. 1981). "Fraud" derives from the 
pre-ERISA state law. See, e.g., Dowling v. Texas & N.O.R. Co., 80 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-Galveston 1935, writ ref'd). 
77. Pilon v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 861 
F.2d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. District 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n-Associ-
ated Maritime Officers, Medical Plan, 857 F . 2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1988); Nevill v. Shell Oil 
Co., 835 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1987); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Pierre v. Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 866 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1989); Blakeman v. Mead Containers, 
779 F.2d 1146, 1149 (6th Cir. 1985). 
78. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 
1987); Sharron v. Amalgamated Ins. Agency Servs., Inc., 704 F.2d 562, 564 (11th Cir. 1983). 
79. Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 
(3d Cir. 1984). Other circuits have refused to adopt this limitation. See Holland v. Burlington 
Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903, a.ff'd sub nom. 
Brooks v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986). 
80. Struble, 732 F .2d at 334. 
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The court, amazingly, will apply the statutorily mandated standard for some 
discretionary plan administrator decisions, yet retain a court created excep-
tion to the standard for other discretionary decisions. The Third Circuit 
also refuses to apply the arbitrary and capricious rule if the plan administra-
tor possesses a financial interest in the outcome. 81 
The Fifth Circuit does not require substantial evidence under the arbitrary 
and capricious rule, 82 and therefore, has adopted several factors for deter-
81. Haeffele v. Hercules, Inc., 839 F .2d 952, 957 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that questions of 
fact preclude summary judgment on ERISA claims and that a plan administrator's interpreta-
tion of a pension plan is subject to de novo review); Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 
F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 1987) (ruling that the arbitrary and capricious standard does not apply 
when an employee is denied severance pay benefits by employer/administrator of an unfunded 
pension fund), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989); accord Eckersley v. 
WGAL TV, Inc., 831 F.2d 1204, 1208 (3d Cir. 1987) (relying on Bruch's disapproval of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard and holding that an employee's settlement in a suit for 
profit-sharing benefits under an employment contract is included in final average earnings, for 
purposes of calculating the employee's pension benefits). Contra Shiffler v. Equitable Life As-
surance Soc'y, 838 F.2d 78, 83 n.7 (3d Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply de novo review and sug-
gesting that where the situation involves a personal claim for benefits, the applicable standard 
is "clear error" and "rational basis"). Other circuits have refused to adopt this limitation. See, 
e.g., Sampson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 863 F. 2d 108, 110 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that 
the Third Circuit applies de novo review only in some circumstances and holding that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard applies in an action by an injured employee to recover mon-
ies withheld by his insurance carrier to offset workers compensation payments); Pierre, 866 F. 
2d at 143 (noting that "[t]he [arbitrary and capricious] standard of review has elasticity to 
allow reviewing courts to account for possibilities for self-interest"); South Cen. United Food 
& Commercial Workers Unions v. C. & G. Markets, Inc., 836 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2823 (1988); Shull v. State Mach. Co., Employees Profit Sharing Plan, 836 
F.2d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that judicial review is severely limited where a claim 
under a profit-sharing plan is brought by an "important executive" who, as an original partici-
pant in the plan, consents in advance to have plan disputes resolved by fellow executives); Van 
Boxe/, 836 F .2d at 1049 (suggesting that the arbitrary and capricious standard is a sliding scale 
of judicial review that requires a more penetrating review where there is greater suspicion of 
bias); Simmons v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 844 F.2d 517, 522 (8th Cir. 1988) (acknowledg-
ing the merits of the Third Circuit's de novo review in Bruch, but noting that the traditional 
standard of arbitrary and capricious is the standard most courts follow). The court held that 
an employer's .decision to deny separation benefits to former employees who were offered like 
jobs with the purchasing company was not arbitrary and capricious. Agee v. Armour Foods 
Co., 834 F.2d 144, 145 (8th Cir. 1987); Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 
F.2d 885, 895 (lOth Cir. 1988) (citing Judge Posner's sliding-scale analysis in Van Boxel and 
characterizing the dispute here as one requiring the trustee to balance interests between pres-
ent and future claimants such that the arbitrary and capricious standard is sufficiently flexible 
to allow a reviewing court to adjust for a trustee's bias). 
82. Offutt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 735 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing 
Paris v. Profit Sharing Plan for Employees ~f Howard B. Wolf, Inc., 637 F.2d 357, 362 (5th 
Cir. Feb.) (noting that the Fifth Circuit is not free to adopt the substantial-evidence standard), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981)). 
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mining whether an action is arbitrary and capricious. 83 The Ninth Circuit 
adopted a less deferential standard when a plan administrator had a financial 
interest in the outcome, and reasoned that the arbitrary and capricious rule 
encompasses such a limitation. 84 The Ninth Circuit also has shifted the bur-
den of proof to the plan administrator to show a reasonable purpose if a plan 
excludes a disproportionate number of employees.85 The District of Colum-
bia Circuit suggested that it might limit the arbitrary and capricious rule to 
83. Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bayles v. 
Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1979)). The factors 
include: "(1) uniformity of construction; (2) fair reading and reasonableness of that reading; 
and (3) unanticipated costs." Other circuits have adopted or mentioned these factors as part of 
the rule. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir.) (mention-
ing the Bayles factors for the purpose of determining when to apply the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 145 (1988); Harris v. Pullman Standard, Inc., 809 F.2d 
1495, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987) (using the Bayles factors and holding that an employer's decision 
to give severance pay to only those employees who are offered jobs by the purchasing company 
is arbitrary and capricious). 
84. Pilon v. Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 861 
F.2d 217, 219 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Ninth Circuit will use the arbitrary and capri-
cious language and, at the same time, give "closer scrutiny" to the decision of an employer/ 
plan administrator); Fielding v. International Harvester Co., 815 F.2d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 
1987) (giving an employer/administrator's decision less deference where the decision affects 
the employer financially); Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 801 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 
1986) (extending the "closer scrutiny" theory to a situation involving an administrator's non-
financial decision in the context of an unusually bitter and violent strike); Jung v. FMC Corp., 
755 F.2d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that if "the employer's denial of benefits to a class 
avoids a very substantial outlay, the reviewing court should consider that fact in applying the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review"). The less deferential standard merely means that 
the trial court should be appreciably more critical of the reasons given for the action by the 
plan administrator and less willing to resolve all ambiguities in the plan administrator's favor. 
Dockray, 801 F.2d at 1153. Further, this approach applies only if the conflict is between the 
plan administrator and the employee/beneficiary. Oster v. Barco Employees' Retirement 
Plan, 869 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply the "less deference" standard to 
an employer/administrator's decision where the conflict at issue is between past and future 
beneficiaries rather than between employer and beneficiaries). 
85. See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 
1305 (9th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that the court should sustain a pension plan's interpretation of 
its own regulations as long as it is reasonable); Elser v. I.A.M. Nat'! Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 
648, 657 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a rule which denies pensions to employees who have 
worked a substantially greater time than others who receive benefits shifts the burden to the 
trustees to show a rational connection between the rule and the fund's purpose), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 813 (1983); Miranda v. Audia, 681 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Ponce v. 
Construction Laborers, 628 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that once a plaintiff demon-
strates that a vesting requirement excludes an unusually high percentage of plan participants, 
the court must shift the burden to the plan's trustees to show reasonableness of the require-
ment)); Burroughs v. Board of Trustees Pension Trust, 542 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(recognizing the sizeable exclusion/reasonable justification standard), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
I 096 ( 1977). 
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situations not involving a plan administrator's conflict of interest. 86 Thus, a 
pattern has emerged of applying a more stringent review primarily where a 
plan administrator has a conflict of interest, namely a financial interest, in 
the outcome of the discretionary decision. 
III. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS RULE 
In light of the fact that the arbitrary and capricious rule favors the plan 
administrator, employee/beneficiaries recently have attempted to convince 
courts either to adopt a more even-handed rule or to declare that the rule is 
inappropriate in their situation. 87 The general jurisprudential method 88 
used to distinguish prior cases and thereby carve out a subset of discretion-
ary plan administrator decisions to which the arbitrary and capricious rule 
does not apply, has involved recognizing new fact patterns not previously 
noticed by courts predisposed to use the rule. The distinctions fall into four 
categories of cases that: (1) treat the plan as an ordinary contract, not a 
trust; (2) involve a conflict between a third party and the beneficiaries as a 
class, not individually; (3) deal with an unfunded plan where the employer 
pays the liabilities out of its general assets; and ( 4) involve a financially inter-
ested, not disinterested, plan administrator. Only the second and fourth dis-
tinctions have enjoyed limited success. 
86. Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 865 F.2d 364, 374 (D.C. Cir.) (citing Bruch 
in dicta but holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies where stock bonus 
shares are valued on a minority basis for corporate employer's repurchase of stock, pursuant to 
an agreement that departing employees sell their stock back to the company), cert. denied, 109 
S. Ct. 3162 (1989). 
87. These attacks have become more frequent since 1983. Attorneys for employee/benefi-
ciaries did not mount earlier attacks because they may not have been sufficiently well-versed 
with ERISA to realize that some rule other than the arbitrary and capricious rule might apply. 
See, e.g. , Blakeman v. Mead Containers, 779 F.2d 1146, 1149 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that the 
parties agreed that the rule applied to a non-union-negotiated plan); Sly v. P.R. Mallory & Co., 
Inc., 712 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that the parties agreed that the rule applied 
to a non-union: negotiated plan); see also Denton v. First Nat'! Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1297 n.2 
(5th Cir. 1985) (neither party initially realized ERISA applied). 
88. See, e.g., Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 172 
(1930) ("But if it is clear that a certain fact, however material it may have been, was not 
considered by the court, then the case is not a precedent in future cases in which a similar fact 
appears."). Professor Levi has commented: 
Where case law is considered . . . [the jgdge in the present case] is not bound by the 
statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even in the controlling case. The 
statement is mere dictum, and this means that the judge in the present case may find 
irrelevant the existence or absence of facts which prior judges thought important .... 
In arriving at his result he will ignore what the past thought important; he will em-
phasize facts which prior judges would have thought made no difference. 
E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2-3 (1949) (footnote omitted). 
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A. Treatment as a Contract 
In the earliest attack to reach the circuit courts, the employee/beneficiary 
contended that standard contract interpretation rules should apply to the 
plan administrator's interpretation of a union-negotiated plan provision de-
laying the commencement of his pension benefits. 89 The employee desired a 
contract construction rule that would construe the plan's ambiguous terms 
against the draftsman. 90 The union was the draftsman, and also appointed 
some of the plan administrators, thus the employee/beneficiary would bene-
fit from construction under this rule. 91 The circuit court rejected this argu-
ment because LMRA precedent requires the arbitrary and capricious rule 
for review of a plan administrator's discretionary decision.92 
B. Conflicts with Third Parties 
Another employee/beneficiary argued that the arbitrary and capncwus 
rule does not apply when the discretionary decision involves a conflict be-
tween the employee/beneficiaries as a class against non-beneficiaries. 93 The 
Third Circuit, the most responsive court to employees' dissatisfaction with 
the arbitrary and capricious rule, agreed and refused to apply the rule to a 
89. Harm, 101 F.2d at 1304 (refusing to adopt the contract interpretation rule). 
90. Id. Pre-ERISA state courts initially applied this rule of contract construction when 
they viewed the retirement plan as a contractual arrangement not involving plan administrator 
discretion. See, e.g., Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 57 Ohio App. 4, 6, 1 I N.E.2d 878, 880 
(1937) (holding that courts are to construe booklets in which an employer explains and pro-
motes a pension system most strongly against the employer); Farrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 
376, 105 A.2d 67, 70 (1954) (suggesting that the court must resort to the trust instrument to 
determine and define the limits of the trustee's powers). Courts later extended the rule to cases 
involving plan administrator discretion. See, e.g., Evo v. Jomec, Inc., 119 N.J. Super. 7, 11, 
289 A.2d 551, 554 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (submitting that employee's rights under a 
profit-sharing plan are governed by principles of contract law). Ironically, ERISA, intended to 
benefit employee/beneficiaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982), had preempted all state laws, includ-
ing this pro-employee/beneficiary rule. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982). 
91. Under the pre-ERISA state law, employers sometimes avoided the deleterious effects 
of this contract interpretation rule by specifically providing discretion in the plan to the plan 
administrator concerning such matters as benefit claims and plan interpretation. See, e.g., 
Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790-91 (8th Cir. 1944) (diversity action) (refusing to inter-
pret a pension plan as an insurance contract because of a plan provision stating that decisions 
of the plan's board are conclusive); contra Levitt v. Billy Penn Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 499, 283 
A.2d 873, 875-76 (Super. Ct. 1971) (suggesting that even where words such as "absolute dis-
cretion" are used in a pension plan, such terms do not give the plan administrator absolute 
discretion in regard to payment of benefits to employees). 
92. Harm, 701 F.2d at 1304 (citing Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 654 F.2d 650, 
655 (9th Cir. 1981) (relying on the "well-established" rule that the courts will sustain decisions 
of those empowered with the administration of an employee pension trust unless arbitrary and 
capricious or contrary to law)). 
93. Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 332-33 
(3d Cir. 1984). 
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decision by the employer/trustee of a union-negotiated welfare plan.94 The 
employer/trustee decided (and obtained the approval of the impartial arbi-
trator as provided under the LMRA) to use the surplus in a medical plan, 
which arose from an excess of premiums over payments to beneficiaries, to 
reduce future employer contributions rather than increase the employees' 
medical benefits.95 Because the plan administrator's discretionary decision 
favored the employers, the court applied the statutory standard of ERISA, 
the prudent man rule, and remanded the case to obtain facts necessary to 
that review.96 
C. Unfunded Plans 
The next assault on the application of the arbitrary and capricious rule 
dealt with an unfunded severance pay policy, in essence a welfare plan. The 
employee/beneficiary pointed out that the arbitrary and capricious rule 
originates in trust law;97 because an unfunded welfare plan lacks a trust, the 
rule should not apply. 98 The court, however, refused to recognize this dis-
tinction, fearing exceptions to the rule would cause confusion. 99 
D. Financially Interested Plan Administrators 
Last came a charge premised on the idea that courts designed the arbi-
trary and capricious rule for financially disinterested plan administrators. 100 
94. Id. (using a standard of "act[ing] with the requisite prudence and with complete and 
undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries); accord Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 
134, 138 n.5 (3d Cir. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989). 
95. Struble, 732 F.2d at 329. I 
96. Id. Several circuits have refused to adopt this limitation on the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule. See, e.g. , Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (lOth 
Cir. 1988); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985) (opining 
that there is no reason to deviate from the Fourth Circuit's arbitrary and capricious rule if the 
employer decides to deny severance pay because the buying corporation offers all employees 
similar employment), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903, aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus., 
Inc., 477 U.S. 901 (1986); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1985). This limita-
tion is remarkable because the court applies the statutorily mandated standard for some discre-
tionary decisions and applies a different standard for the remaining discretionary decisions. 
The statute makes no such distinction, and, therefore, one may have thought that the same 
principle applied in both situations. 
97. Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958) (suggesting that the court's review is 
limited to insuring proper administration of the fund by the trustees). 
98. Holland, 772 F.2d at 1147. 
99. Id. Because ERISA involves numerous complex rules, especially in the tax area, it is 
amazing that a court would concern itself with a relatively minor exception to one of ERISA's 
less complex rules. 
100. Courts developed the rule for the LMRA cases. See, e.g., Ruth, 166 F. Supp. at 347. 
The LMRA requires that the plan administrator consist of equal numbers of employer and 
union representatives with an impartial umpire to decide deadlocked matters. 29 U.S.C. 
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The Ninth Circuit adopted the "less deference" test when presented with the 
situation of a company-appointed plan administrator who denied severance 
pay to those employees hired by the subsequent employer. This less defer-
ence test means that the trial court should be appreciably more critical of the 
reasons advanced by the plan administrator for the decision and less willing 
to resolve ambiguities in the plan administrator's favor. 101 The Seventh Cir-
cuit, however, refused to abandon the arbitrary and capricious rule when an 
employee/beneficiary of a company retirement plan, who was denied disabil-
ity benefits, contended that the company-appointed plan administrator could 
not function as a disinterested plan administrator. 102 
The Sixth Circuit also adhered to the arbitrary and capricious rule when 
an employee/beneficiary of a company retirement plan, denied acceleration 
of retirement benefits at a time when other similarly situated employees had 
their benefits accelerated, argued that the company-appointed plan adminis-
trator had an inherent conflict of interest. 103 When the Seventh Circuit con-
fronted this same problem it retained the arbitrary and capricious rule, but 
§ 186(c)(5) (1982). Hence, the plan administrator should be neutral or, at least, balanced with 
some members sympathetic to the employee/beneficiary. The Eighth Circuit refused to make 
the distinction between union-negotiated plans and other plans. In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318, 
320 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that the Eighth Circuit uniformly reviews trustee's decisions under 
the arbitrary and capricious standard or the abuse of discretion standard). 
101. Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708,711-712 (9th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that where an 
employer avoids a substantial outlay, "[l]ess deference should be given to the trustee's deci-
sion"); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text; accord Dockray v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 
801 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the plan administrator of a company who 
denied early retirement to a striking employee was financially interested since he was a high 
management official of the employer). Contra Holland, 772 F.2d at 1149 ("We see no reason 
to vary the standard based on procedural violations indicating bad faith, for such situations 
can be adequately resolved under the traditional standard."); Anderson v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 
759 F.2d 1518, 1521 (11th Cir.) (finding that "there is simply no authority for the proposition 
that procedural errors in an ERISA plan's management requires something other than the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995 (1985). 
102. Brown v. Retirement Comm. of Briggs & Stratton, 797 F .2d 521 , 526 (7th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987). The plan administrator was financially interested because 
each committee member, as a company employee, id. at 535, depended on the employer/con-
tributor for continuing employment. The decision to deny disability benefits clearly reduced 
the payout (benefits and expenses) from the defined benefit plan and hence reduced the em-
ployer's future contributions. The employee/beneficiary correctly depicted this plan adminis-
trator as having an adversarial role similar to that of an insurance claims adjuster. !d. at 526. 
The court, however, failed to comprehend the situation, relying on statutory descriptions of a 
plan administrator's role in an ideal world. 
103. Varhola v. Doe, 820 F .2d 809 (6th Cir. 1987) (remanded for factual findings resulting 
from the trial court's failure to investigate the reasonableness of the plan administrator's ac-
tion). The court admitted that if it were considering the standard of review in the absence of 
prior decisions employing the arbitrary and capricious rule, it would be inclined to use a 
stricter standard of review for a company-appointed plan administrator consisting of execu-
tives rather than the supposedly neutral LMRA plan administrator. /d. at 813. 
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highlighted the flexibility and elasticity of the rule, thus providing a sliding 
scale of judicial review. 104 The Third Circuit, when considering a severance 
pay policy under which a company-appointed plan administrator denied 
benefits, abandoned the arbitrary and capricious rule for financially inter-
ested plan administrators and developed an "arm's length" interpretation 
standard and de novo review.105 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision 
on the ground that the plan did not give discretionary authority to the plan 
administrator and hence the arbitrary and capricious rule did not apply.106 
104. Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 
1988); accord Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 866 F. 2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1989); Sage 
v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (lOth Cir. 1988); Shull v. State 
Mach. Co., Employees Profit Sharing Plan, 836 F.2d 306, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1987); Maggard v. 
O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The flexibility works as follows: 
The fundamental difference in the depth or penetration or exactingness of judicial 
review is between deferential and nondeferential review, that is, between reversing a 
tribunal's decision because it is unreasonable and reversing it merely because it is 
wrong. Sometimes even. this difference blurs. When the members of the tribunal-
for example, the trustees of a pension plan-have a serious conflict of interest, the 
proper de.ference to give their decisions may be slight, even zero; the decision if 
wrong may be unreasonable. 
Van Boxe/, 836 F.2d at 1052. 
105. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir. 1987), a.lf'd in part 
and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989); accord Haeffele v. Hercules Inc. , 839 F.2d 952, 957 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (de novo review permitted). See supra note 81 for decisions refusing to adopt this 
rule. 
106. Firestone, 109 S. Ct. at 956. Acknowledging that Firestone changed the law retroac-
tively, see, e.g. , Orozco v. United Air Lines, Inc., 887 F. 2d 949 (9th Cir. 1989), the circuit 
courts are presently groping for the correct standard of review for discretionary plan adminis-
trator decisions. See de Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1186 (4th Cir. 1989) (Firestone 
has mandated total abandonment of the arbitrary and capricious standard); Aubrey v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., 886 F.2d 119, 121-22 (6th Cir. 1989) (Firestone rejected the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard). None have engaged in any analysis either from the principles established by 
the Supreme Court or from policy considerations to determine that standard. The Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits have announced the new standard as the abuse of discretion rule, amazingly 
citing Firestone (whose holding is limited to the nondiscretionary case) for the proposition 
without any recognition that this standard is part of the trust Jaw and without any explanation 
of what this new rule entails. Consequently, these circuits proceed to use the arbitrary and 
capricious rule. See, e.g., de Nobel, 885 F.2d at 1186 (used deferential abuse of discretion test 
of Van Boxe/, an arbitrary and capricious case); Boyd v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers 
Health & Retirement Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989) (an arbitrary and capricious act is 
clearly an abuse of discretion); Batchelor v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 877 F.2d 441 
(5th Cir. 1989) (plan administrator decision must be reviewed for an abuse of discretion pursu-
ant to Lowry v. Bankers Life & Casualty Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1989)); 
Lowry, 871 F.2d at 525 (an abuse of discretion may be the same as arbitrary and capricious). 
The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have extracted another principle from Firestone. De 
novo review applies only to those cases involving an absence of discretion. Therefore, once the 
court has determined that the employee benefit plan grants discretion to the plan administrator 
concerning the decision, de novo review cannot be applied and the court will continue to use 
the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Harsco Corp., 884 F.2d 98, 101 (3d 
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IV. THE ORIGIN OF THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS RULE 
In accordance with ideas propounded by Justice Holmes, 107 before courts 
can determine the proper standard of review for plan administrators' discre-
tionary decisions, they must examine the origin of the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule. Most courts have yet to make this investigation. Consequently, 
they lack the perspective from which the rule is derived, and as a result 
possess no idea of its function, purpose, and limitations. The confusion in 
the various circuits concerning Ihe rule's formulation and variations reflects 
this lack of knowledge. 108 In such an environment, courts possess a duty to 
Cir. 1989); Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989); Lowry, 
871 F.2d at 525. 
The Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have devised a third principle from Firestone. In 
the presence of discretion, the court must use the arbitrary and capricious standard. See, e.g., 
Baker v. Big Star Div. of the Grand Union Co., 888 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir., 1989); Davis By and 
Through Farmers Bank and Capital Trust Co. v. Kentucky Finance Cos. Retirement Plan, 887 
F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1989); Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 38-39 
(11th Cir. 1989); Lakey v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 874 F.2d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 1989). 
Other courts avoided the issue. See, e.g. , McMahan v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 888 
F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1989) (parties agreed that the review should have been de novo); Parsons v. 
West Virginia Works Hourly Employees Pension Plan, 879 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1989) (parties 
conceded de novo review); Gunderson v. W.R. Grace & Co. Long Term Disability Income 
Plan, 874 F.2d 496, 498 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989) (action falls under de novo rather than arbitrary 
and capricious rule); Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 873 F.2d 486 (lst Cir. 1989) (plan 
administrator conceded de novo review was the rule and the court did not reverse because the 
trial court used a more stringent test than arbitrary and capricious); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich 
Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1297 (5th Cir. 1989) (employee/beneficiary failed to allege an arbitrary 
and capricious act). In the absence of discretion, the courts use de novo review. Baker, 888 
F.2d at 1557; Sejman v. Warner-Lambert Co., 889 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1989); Nichol v. Pull-
man Standard, Inc., 889 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1989); Orozco, 887 F.2d at 951; Moon v. American 
Home Assur. Co., 888 F.2d 86 (lith Cir. 1989); Baxter By and Through Baxter v. Lynn, 886 
F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989); Aubrey, 886 F.2d at 122; Wallace v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
882 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1989); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local47 v. Southern Cal. 
Edison Co., 880 F.2d 104, 108 (9th Cir. 1989); Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 
546 (6th Cir. 1989); Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 875 F.2d 1075, 1079 (4th Cir. 1989). 
107. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881). "In order to know what [the law] is, we 
must know what it has been, and what it tends to become." /d. at l. "The history of what the 
law has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is." /d. at 37. 
108. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text. The situation typifies another state-
ment of Justice Holmes: 
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history, is 
this. The customs, bel\efs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. 
In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule 
remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious 
minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy 
is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of 
things . ... 
0. HOLMES, supra note 107, at 5. 
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reexamine that policy, to determine whether that policy still applies to pres-
ent situations, and, if not, to devise the proper rule. 109 
A. State Common Law 
Early on, employee benefit plans granted plan administrators discretion in 
interpreting plan provisions and determining payment of benefits. The earli-
est courts reviewing a plan administrator's exercise of discretion in these two 
areas struggled to determine what arrangement existed among the employer, 
employee/beneficiary, and plan administrator and, hence, what legal princi-
ples applied by analogy to the situation. 110 The earliest case in this area 
treated a profit-sharing plan comprised solely of employer contributions as 
an inchoate gift from the employer to the employee, 111 and indicated that a 
court might supervise the plan administrator if "the defendant's trustees 
were squandering the fund, or were guilty of bad faith in its manage-
ment."112 Next, several courts faced voluntary relief associations: disability 
benefit plans comprised solely of employee contributions controlled by em-
ployer-appointed trustees, the forerunner of present day pension plans. 113 
These courts either applied the rule applicable to fraternal orders and mu-
tual benefit societies, reversing the plan administrator's discretionary action 
/d. 
109. Cf 0. HOLMES, supra note 107, at 37. 
When we find that in large and important branches of the law the various grounds of 
policy on which the various rules have been justified are later inventions to account 
for what are in fact survivals from more primitive times, we have a right to recon-
sider the popular reasons, and, taking a broader view of the field, to decide anew 
whether those reasons are satisfactory. 
110. See generally Ziskind, The Law of Employee Benefit Plans, 1955 WASH. U.L.Q. 112 
(primarily contract or trust). 
Ill. McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 32 A.D. 610, 53 N.Y.S. 98 (App. Div. 1898), aff'd, 
167 N.Y. 530, 60 N.E. 1115 (1901). The court upheld a denial of benefits to a discharged 
employee for a plan under the absolute control of the trustee/administrators. The dissent 
thought the arrangement constituted a contract supported by valuable consideration that the 
trustee/administrators could not rescind. /d. at 617, 53 N.Y.S. at 103. 
112. /d. at 613, 53 N.Y.S. at 100. This early idea of using bad faith to reverse the plan 
administrator's discretionary decision was not an issue before the court. However, some state 
courts adopted the approach of listing bad faith as a ground for reversal when depicting a 
pension plan as a gratuity. See Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1944) (fraud 
or arbitrary action); Amicone v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 19 Utah 2d 297, 300, 431 P.2d 130, 
132 (1967) (bad faith, fraud, mistake, or arbitrariness). But see Umshler v. Umshler, 332 Ill. 
App. 494, 499, 76 N.E.2d 231, 233 (1947) (rejecting the bad faith exception to no judicial 
review for inchoate gifts). Others have used the finding of bad faith to override discretion 
without acknowledging the source of the rule. See In re Missouri Pac. R. Co., .49 F. Supp. 405, 
406 (E.D. Mo. 1943) (diversity action) (unreasonable, arbitrary, unfair or capricious). 
113. See Norman v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 322 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1959). 
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only if it was "fraudulent or oppressive," 114 or applied the rule applicable to 
arbitration awards, overturning the arbitration award only if "fraud or mis-
take" caused it. 115 These early state cases are obviously the source of the 
bad faith and fraud additions to the arbitrary and capricious rule. 116 
The seminal state case, Clark v. New England Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 117 addressed a welfare plan that paid benefits to dependents of employ-
ees killed on the job. The court analogized the plan, comprised solely of 
employer contributions and administered by an employer-appointed plan ad-
ministrator, to a construction contract or a sales contract in which one party 
would provide the building or goods to the satisfaction of the other party. 118 
Hence, the court concluded that it would overturn the plan administrator's 
decision only after finding evidence of "want of good faith." 119 Many subse-
quent state courts adopted this contractual approach and viewed Clark as 
controlling the situation. 120 Since then, few employee/beneficiaries have 
114. See, e.g., Nelson v. Atlantic Coast LineR. Co., 157 N.C. 156, 167, 72 S.E. 998, 1003 
(1911). See also Cimprich v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 119 Pa. Super. 5, 9, 180 A. 51, 56 (Super. 
Ct. 1935) (plan administrator's decisions cannot be attacked collaterally absent fraud or irreg-
ularity). The court determined that the policy behind the rule was that court review, if al-
lowed, would foment frequent litigation by each dissatisfied employee/beneficiary and cause 
trustees to waste (deliver to attorneys) funds raised for wise and beneficial purposes. Id. at 15, 
180 A. at 55. This policy, grounded in mutual benefit society law, does not apply to modern 
welfare plans because employers would bear the cost in future contributions (or reduced bene-
fits) and Congress designed ERISA's two-tiered claim procedure to reduce litigation. See 120 
CoNG. REc. S29,941 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Javits) (explaining the rejec-
tion of a prior claims proposal in favor of the two-tiered system "on grounds it might be too 
costly to plans and a stimulant to frivolous benefit disputes"). 
115. Pennsylvania Co. v. Reager's Adm'x, 152 Ky. 824, 837, 154 S.W. 412, 417 (1913). 
The court upheld a railroad relief department decision to terminate a disability benefit because 
the beneficiary could earn a living. /d. at 835, 154 S.W. at 417. The court treated the arrange-
ment as a contract with an arbitration provision appointing the plan administrator as the arbi-
trator. /d. The policy behind the rule was to foster out-of-court settlements by impartial 
tribunals (the employee/beneficiary participated in electing some members of the plan admin-
istrator). This policy, however, does not apply to the typical situation of the company plan 
where the company selects the plan administrator. 
116. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
117. 229 Mass. 1, 118 N.E. 348 (1917). In Clark, the court upheld the plan administrator's 
discretionary decision not to pay benefits to a deceased employee's father because the father 
had signed a statement claiming he was not dependent on his son. /d. at 9, 118 N.E. at 350. 
118. /d. at 3-4, 118 N.E. at 349. 
119. /d. at 9, 118 N.E. at 350. 
120. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Robertson, 146 Ark. 406, 414-15, 225 S.W. 649, 
652-53 (1920) (no evidence of bad faith); Norman v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 322 S.W.2d 
95, 99 (Ky. 1959) (bad faith); Van Pelt v. Berefco., Inc., 60 Ill. App. 2d 415, 424, 208 N.E.2d 
858, 863 (1965) (fair and reasonable but uses bad faith); Moore v. Postal TeL-Cable Co., 202 
S.C. 225, 232, 24 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1943) (fraud or bad faith but uses unreasonable test); Long 
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 442 S.W.2d 462, 466-67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, writ 
n.r.e.) (fraud and bad faith); Dowling v. Texas & New Orleans R.R., 80 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. 
Civ. App.-Galveston 1935, no writ) (not subject to attack in the courts except upon a showing 
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succeeded in proving that the plan administrator made his decision in bad 
faith, 121 perhaps because the employee/beneficiary must prove bad faith by 
"overwhelming" evidence. 122 
Another approach adopted by some state courts considered the arrange-
ment as a trust and applied trust law, 123 a procedure later followed in the 
LMRA cases. 124 The portion of trust law used by the courts permitted over-
turning the plan administrator's decision if the court deemed the decision 
"unreasonable." 125 
of fraud or bad faith); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Butler, 86 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort 
Worth 1935, no writ) (good faith). Some state courts followed Clark even when viewing the 
situation as a gratuity. See Spiner v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-Beaumont 1934, no writ) (not subject to attack in the court absent actual fraud or bad 
faith). 
Some state courts following a trust theory have also viewed Clark as dispositive. See 
Schwartz v. Century Circuit, Inc. , 39 Del. Ch. 340, 346, 163 A.2d 793, 796 (1960) (fraud, bad 
faith, or the like). 
Other state courts have used the lack of good faith rule without an indication of its source. 
See Paddock Pool Constr. Co. v. Monseur, 23 Ariz. App. 451, 453, 533 P.2d 1188, 1190 
(1975); Bos v. United States Rubber Co., 100 Cal. App. 2d 565, 570 224 P.2d 386, 398 (1950). 
121. In Schwartz, 39 Del. Ch. at 348-49, 163 A.2d at 798, a Delaware state court adopted 
the contractual approach and found bad faith in the forfeiture of profit-sharing credits under a 
provision for forfeiture due to dishonesty or gross misconduct. The committee members were 
company employees and the defendants in a lawsuit filed by the employee/beneficiary and had 
an antagonistic attitude toward the employee/beneficiary. Hence, bad faith relates to motive 
and conflicts of interest. 
Other employee/beneficiaries prevailed under state law, but an examination of the cases 
indicates that a reasonableness test (from trust law), and not bad faith, provided the reasoning 
even though the courts used a contractual approach. See Moore, 202 S.C. at 227, 24 S.E.2d at 
363; Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 48 Ohio App. 450, 194 N.E. 441 (1934). 
122. Lano v. Rochester Germicide Co., 261 Minn. 556, 563, 113 N.W.2d 460, 465 (1962); 
Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1944) (analogizing the situation to architect 
arbitration provisions in construction contracts). 
123. Forrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 376-77, 105 A.2d 67, 70 (1954) ("[W]hile a court 
cannot control the discretion conferred upon a trustee, it may compel him to exercise it in 
good faith and within the bounds of a reasonable judgment" (quoting In re Brown's Appeal, 
345 Pa. 373, 379, 229 A.2d 52, 55 (1942))); Leigh v. Estate of Leigh, 55 Misc. 2d 294, 297, 284 
N.Y.S.2d 991, 994-95 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (arbitrary or bad faith); accord Bird v. Connecticut 
Power Co., 144 Conn. 456, 133 A.2d 894 (1957) (whim). 
Some courts following a contractual theory have used the trust rule. See Wilson, 48 Ohio 
App. at 450, 194 N.E. at 441 (whim or caprice). 
124. See, e.g., Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1958). See also infra notes 133-52 
and accompanying text. 
125. See, e.g., Forrish, 377 Pa. at 376-77, 105 A.2d at 70; Reese v. Administrative Comm. 
of the Profit Sharing Trust, 218 Cal. App. 2d 646, 649, 32 Cal. Rptr. 818, 820 (1963); Van Pelt, 
60 Ill. App. 2d at 424, 208 N.E.2d at 864. Forrish was cited in Brown's Appeal, 345 Pa. at 379, 
29 A.2d at 55, for this proposition, which in turn cited the Restatement of Trusts. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 comment h (court will intervene if the trustee acts arbitrar-
ily or by whim). 
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The contractual construction rule provided the other pillar of state law 
review of plan administrator discretionary actions. Even when the plan ad-
ministrator had discretion, 126 those courts that viewed the plan as a contract 
construed the plan's ambiguous terms against the employer and in favor of 
the employee. 127 In contrast, those courts that treated the plan as a trust 
tended to construe the trust indenture strictly in favor of the draftsman/ 
settlor by determining his intent and against the employee/beneficiary. 128 
Although this state law, with its bad faith and construction against the 
draftsman rules, may be regarded as part of the common law of employee 
benefit plans that a federal court could use in formulating the federal com-
mon law of employee benefit plans, 129 ERISA specifically preempted all 
state laws that related to retirement and welfare plans. 130 Although no sub-
sequent court has directly applied state law to an ERISA plan, 131 the state 
contract cases appear to have sown the seed of the bad faith addition to the 
ERISA arbitrary and capricious rule. 
126. See, e.g., Rochester Corp. v. W.L. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1971); Smith v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 231 F . Supp. 980 (E.D. Tenn. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 350 F.2d 
258 (6th Cir. 1965); Frietzsche v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 168 Cal. App. 2d 705, 336 P.2d 
589 (1959); Evo v. Jomac, Inc., 119 N.J. Super. 7, 289 A.2d 551 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); 
Levitt v. Billy Penn Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 499, 283 A.2d 873 (1971); Thornbery v. MGS Co., 
Inc., 46 Wis. 2d 592, 176 N.W.2d 355 (1970); accord Brinzo v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 
66 (Del. Ch. 1973) (where agreement is ambiguous reviewing court may not rewrite the agree-
ment). 
Even those courts viewing the situation as a trust sometimes used the construction rule. See, 
e.g., Farrish, 377 Pa. at 376, 105 A.2d at 70 (partial discretion). However, those courts viewing 
the situation as a gratuity refused to use the construction rule. See, e.g., Menke, 140 F.2d at 
786 (contract not interpreted strictly against the employer because burden employee assumed 
was entirely voluntary and gratuitous). 
127. Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E.2d 878 (1937); see also 
supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
128. See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 30, at 5 ("Courts strictly interpret the plan inden-
ture"), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4643. 
129. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). Congress reasoned that preemption would eliminate the 
threat of conflicting and inconsistent state and local regulations, see 120 CONG. REC. S29,933 
(daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement by Sen. Williams), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5188, and the threat of one state court using a contractual approach of 
interpretation and another using a trust approach. 
131. One circuit court's ERISA opinion added a state case to its string citations for the 
"bad faith" proposition. Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retire-
ment Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 599 (2d Cir.) (citing Wyper v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 
57, 62 (2d Cir. 1976) (applying state law citations that trace back to Clark v. New England 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 229 Mass. 1, 118 N.E. 348 (1918))), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983). The 
Fifth Circuit has specifically rejected the state construction rule. Bayles v. Central States, S.E. 
& S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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B. Common Law Under the LMRA 
The only standard for plan administrator behavior contained in the 
LMRA was the loyalty standard derived from trust law. According to this 
standard, plan administrators must operate the plan for the "sole and exclu-
sive benefit" of the employee/beneficiaries. 132 Hence, after the LMRA's 
passage, the behavior standard for plan administrators, at least for union-
negotiated plans, rested upon this trust law standard. The question of court 
review of the plan administrator's discretionary decisions under this stan-
dard, not contained in the statute, first arose in four district court cases in-
volving the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement 
Fund. 
In Hobbs v. Lewis, 133 the plan administrators denied a nearly illiterate 
worker a pension without informing him of the reason for the denial. The 
administrator based the denial on discrepancies between his certified union 
statement and the Social Security Agency records in his twenty-year service 
record. The plan administrators contended that the plan was a charitable 
trust requiring review of their discretionary act under trust law fiduciary 
standards. 134 Consequently, the plan administrators argued that the court 
could not interfere unless the plan administrators had acted arbitrarily or 
unreasonably. 135 The court determined that the trust was noncharitable and 
that the arbitrary and capricious rule applied. However, even using that 
rule, the court found that refusing to accept the union certified statement, as 
provided for in the plan's regulations, and not making an investigation con-
cerning the discrepancy, amounted to arbitrary and unreasonable acts. 136 
In Ruth v. Lewis, 137 the plan administrators denied a pension to an eighty-
seven-year-old illiterate. The court, after hearing testimony of the em-
ployee's daughter and numerous other witnesses, and after reviewing com-
pany records, which did not agree with the employee/beneficiary's 
application, developed the absence of the de novo review requirement of the 
132. This standard is the same standard that a trustee must satisfy under trust law. Com-
pare 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 170(1) (1959) 
(on the duty of loyalty). 
133. 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958). 
134. /d. at 286. The review standards for a fiduciary's discretionary decision for both a 
charitable trust and a noncharitable trust are the same. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 382 (1959) with § 187. The distinction retains importance only in that state attor-
neys general also enforce charitable trusts. See, e.g., 4A W. FRATCHER, ScoTT ON TRUSTS 
§ 391 (1988). 
135. Hobbs, 159 F . Supp. at 286. See also infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
136. Hobbs, 159 F. Supp. at 287. 
137. 166 F . Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1959). 
164 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 39:133 
arbitrary and capricious rule. 138 The court determined that the plan was a 
noncharitable trust and that court review of plan administrator action was 
limited to cases involving breach of fiduciary trust, fraud or arbitrary action 
(sometimes described as arbitrary or capricious action). 139 The court recited 
the following policy reasons: (1) court review should not render the plan 
administrator's role a nullity, similiar to court review of any trust fiduciary; 
(2) court review should not be lengthy (the hearing of testimony lasted two 
weeks); and (3) the plan administrators should not incur the legal expense of 
uncovering the true facts in court. 140 Hence, the court limited its review to 
the evidence submitted to the plan administrator and remanded the case to 
the plan administrator to determine eligibility on the basis of the new 
evidence. 141 
In Kennet v. United Mine Workers, 142 the plan administrators terminated 
payments to an employee/beneficiary, who had previously received pay-
ments, because subsequent investigation indicated that his service did not 
amount to bona fide service. 143 The court rejected the trust approach and 
determined that the relationship formed a contract for which the employee/ 
beneficiary was a third-party beneficiary. 144 The court limited its review to a 
determination of first, in a non-de novo proceeding, whether substantial evi-
dence supported the plan administrator's decision (not whether the decision 
was contrary to the weight of evidence), and second, whether the action was 
arbitrary or capricious. The court dismissed the case because substantial evi-
dence supported the decision. 
In Barlow v. Roche, 145 the plan administrators refused to reimburse cer-
tain medical expenses of an employee because the employee/beneficiary had 
not filed the.proper form prior to incurring the expense, as required by the 
plan.146 The court rejected the third-party beneficiary theory, noting that 
the plan constituted a trust. Consequently, the court applied the trust rule 
of court review of the plan administrator's action to determine whether suffi-
cient fraud, maliciousness, bad faith, or arbitrariness and cavalierness existed 
to such a degree as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 147 
138. Id. at 349. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. 183 F. Supp. 315 (D.D.C. 1960). 
143. Id. at 317. (The administrator's determination focused on the one-year-immediately-
prior-to-retirement requirement.). 
144. Id. at 317-18. 
145. 161 A.2d 58 (D.C. 1960). 
146. Id. at 60. 
147. Id. at 63. 
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The first case to reach the circuit courts, Danti v. Lewis, 148 became the 
definitive statement of the rule for all other LMRA cases. In Danti, the plan 
administrators convinced the court that the four district court decisions cor-
rectly formed the standard of review: "whether the Trustees have acted ar-
bitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith; that is, is the decision of the Trustees 
supported by substantial evidence or have they made an erroneous decision 
on a question of law." 149 Thus, the LMRA arbitrary and capricious rule 
rests upon the trust law first applied by the lower courts, 150 in particular the 
rule for court review of discretionary action by the trustee. 151 Subsequent 
courts have recognized that the Danti court adopted the trust review rule. 152 
C. ERISA Creates Fiduciary Standards 
Congress, by passing ERISA, considerably bolstered the language of the 
LMRA concerning the fiduciary standard of behavior, primarily by modify-
ing the "sole and exclusive benefit" language of the LMRA and adding the 
ERISA requirement that plan fiduciaries act with the care and skill of a 
prudent man in like circumstances. 153 Legislative history indicates that 
courts should interpret this language as incorporating the trust common law 
with appropriate adjustments for differences between traditional trusts and 
employee benefit plans. 154 However, this change in language and accompa-
148. 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
149. /d. at 348. 
150. Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1958) (the rule for a charitable 
trust); Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C. 1958) (the rule for a noncharitable trust); 
Kennet v. United Mine Workers, 183 F. Supp. 315, 318 (D.D.C. 1960) (the rule of Hobbs); 
Barlow, 161 A.2d at 63 (citing Scorr ON TRUSTS§ 187 (2d ed. 1956)). 
151. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 (1959) provides: "Where discretion 
is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject 
to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by the trustee of his discretion." 
152. See, e.g. , Fielding v. International Harvester Co., 815 F.2d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(to some extent the standard of review comes from trust law) (citing progeny of Danti v. 
Lewis, 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962)); Berry v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1006 (4th 
Cir. 1988) (the standard of review is the traditional standard of review of the law of trusts) 
(citing Danti progeny); Wardle v. Central States Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 
1980) (same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 112 (1981). 
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). 
154. The House Report provides: 
[E]ven where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the form of a trust, reliance on 
conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan 
participants and beneficiaries. This is because trust law had developed in the context 
of testamentary and inter vivos trusts (usually designed to pass designated property 
to an individual or small group of persons) with an attendant emphasis on carrying 
out the instructions of the settlor . . .. [C]ourts applying trust law to employee benefit 
plans have allowed the same kinds of deviations, even though the typical employee 
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nying legislative history instruction went largely unnoticed by the circuit 
courts. 
In each circuit, the initial cases that arose under ERISA also involved 
LMRA, and, therefore, the courts uniformly used the LMRA rule, 155 de-
benefit plan, covering hundreds or even thousands of participants, is quite different 
from the testamentary trust both in purpose and in nature. 
The principles of fiduciary conduct are adopted from existing trust law, but with 
modifications appropriate for employee benefit plans. These salient principles place a 
twofold duty on every fiduciary: to act in his relationship to the plan's fund as a 
prudent man in a similar situation and under like conditions would act, and to act 
consistently with the principles of administering the trust for the exclusive purposes 
previously enumerated .... 
H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 30, at 12-13, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 4650-51. The Conference Report states: "The conferees expect that the courts will 
interpret this prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special 
nature and purpose of employee benefit plans." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 6, at 
302, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5083. 
155. See Wolfv. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing 
an LMRA case of the same circuit); Van Gunten v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension 
Fund, 672 F.2d 586, 587 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing an LMRA case of another circuit); Maggard v. 
O'Connell, 671 F .2d 568, 570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing an LMRA case of the same circuit); 
Palino v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854, 858 (1st Cir. 1981) (citing an LMRA case of the same circuit); 
Horn v. Mullins, 650 F.2d 35, 37 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing an LMRA case of the same circuit); 
Peckham v. Board of Trustees of the Int'l Bhd. of Painters & Allied Trades Union, 653 F.2d 
424, 426 (lOth Cir. 1981) (citing an ERISA case and an LMRA case from another circuit); 
Haeberle v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo Carpenters Health-Care, Dental, Pension & Supple-
mental Funds, 624 F.2d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing LMRA cases from other circuits); 
Gordon v. ILWU-PMA Benefit Funds, 616 F.2d 433, 437 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing an LMRA 
case of the same circuit); Bayles v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 
97, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing LMRA cases from other circuits); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 
F.2d 1266, 1272 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing an LMRA case of another circuit); Bueneman v. Cen-
tral States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 572 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing 
. LMRA cases of the same circuit). 
Because the Fifth Circuit was divided in 1981 to create the present Fifth and Eleventh Cir-
cuits, the Eleventh Circuit has followed the Fifth Circuit. 
Several circuits have devised the rule more than once, either from another circuit, see Cham-
bless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 772 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985) (union-
negotiated plan), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012 (1986); Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d 
Cir. 1984); Carter v. Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Plan, 656 F.2d 575, 576 (lOth 
Cir. 1981); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local No. 
111 v. Douglas, 646 F .2d 1211, 1214 (7th Cir.) (union-negotiated plan), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
866 (1981), or from an LMRA case in the same circuit. See Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 
1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (union-negotiated plan); Stewart v. National Shopmen Pension 
Fund, 795 F .2d 1079, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (union-negotiated plan); McConnell v. Meba 
Medical & Benefits Plan, 778 F.2d 521 , 523 (9th Cir. 1985) (union-negotiated plan); District 
17, Dist. 29, Local Union 7113, & Local Union 6023 v. Allied Corp., 765 F.2d 412, 417 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985); Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare 
Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 334 (3d Cir. 1984) (union-negotiated plan); Elser v. lAM Nat'l 
Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1982) (union-negotiated plan); Pompano v. Michael 
Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1039 (1982); Fen-
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spite congressional disapproval of the LMRA fiduciary conduct stan-
dards.156 The similar language of the "sole and exclusive benefit" standard 
may have provided another reason implicitly used by the courts to continue 
the use of the LMRA arbitrary and capricious rule. 157 The exception to this 
trend involved one Sixth Circuit case158 that used the prudent man rule, but 
no subsequent court has cited the case on this point. The First and Second 
Circuits noted the prudent man rule for ERISA cases but used the LMRA 
rule. 159 The Third Circuit, in an LMRA case, prior to its facing an ERISA 
case, stated that the same arbitrary and capricious rule would have applied 
had the employee/beneficiary brought the case under ERISA. 160 The Sev-
enth Circuit has refused to follow the prudent man rule and employs the 
LMRA rule. 161 
V. THE PROPER RULE 
Determining the applicable rule under ERISA for court review of a plan 
administrator's discretionary action involves a retrospective review of the 
tron Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1307 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(union-negotiated plan). 
156. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 30, at 4 ("[The LMRA] is not intended to establish 
nor does it provide standards for the preservation of vested benefits, funding adequacy, secur-
ity of investment, or fiduciary conduct."), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 4642. 
More recently, circuit courts questioned the appropriateness of the LMRA rule's adoption. 
See, e.g., Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 
1987) ("the arbitrary and capricious standard may be inapt, a historical mistake, or a mechani-
cal extrapolation from different settings"); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1987) 
("[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, we might well be persuaded that [a] stricter standard of 
review should apply"); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[w]e 
do not decide that [the arbitrary and capricious standard] is the only applicable standard of 
review when ERISA's provisions have been flouted"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). 
157. See Comment, supra note 10, at 993-94. However, Congress stated that the "solely 
... and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits" language in ERISA (worded slightly 
differently thari in the LMRA's "sole and exclusive benefit") came from section 401 of the 
Internal Revenue Code. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 6, at 302, reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5083. See also Mittleman, The Exclusive Benefit Rule 
and Diversification, 31 Bus. LAW. 111 (1975); infra note 214. 
158. Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust Fund, 620 F.2d 589, 591 (6th Cir. 1978) (agree-
ing with the district court opinion), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980). 
159. Morse, 732 F.2d at 1145; Palino, 6~ F.2d at 857-58. 
160. Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, 637 F.2d 592, 596 n.5 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981). The Ninth Circuit alsQ believes the ERISA rule 
and the LMRA rule are the same. Elser v. lAM Nat'! Pension Fund, 684 F.2d 648, 652 (9th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 813 (1983). 
161. Allen v. United Mine Workers 1979 Benefit Plan & Trust, 726 F.2d 352, 353-54 (7th 
Cir. 1984). 
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legislative history, prior court interpretations, and specific statutory 
language. 
A. Legislative History Approach 
The United States Supreme Court's pronouncements on the legislative his-
tory of ERISA recognized that Congress intended to codify and make appli-
cable to ERISA fiduciaries certain principles of trust law. 162 To implement 
these intentions, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended that 
the courts develop a federal common law of trusts under ERISA, 163 taking 
into account the special characteristics of employee benefit plans. 164 The 
courts must now resolve the remaining issue of what trust law to apply. 
1. Trust Law Situations 
Trust law provides for the reversal of trustee discretionary actions by 
court review in four situations: (1) when, if a standard exists by which to 
judge the trustee's action, the trustee "acts beyond the bounds of reasonable 
judgment;" (2) when the trustee acts dishonestly; (3) when the trustee acts 
with an improper, though not dishonest, motive; and (4) when the trustee 
fails to act. 165 The courts that developed this trust law used a number of 
phrases to describe these situations or portions thereof. These phrases in-
clude "arbitrary," "capricious," "bad faith," "fraud," and "abuse of discre-
tion."166 Some courts neither clearly distinguished between the situations 
covered by these various phrases, resulting in some overlap, nor clearly dis-
162. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 954 (1989); see H.R. REP. No. 
533, supra note 30, at 12 ("The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes 
applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of 
trusts."), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4649; 120 CONG. REC. 
S29,932 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) ("The objectives of these [fidu-
ciary] provisions are to make applicable the law of trusts ... . "),reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5177, 5186. 
163. See supra note 34. 
164. See supra note 154. 
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 comments e-i (1959). The courts applied 
this trust law in the LMRA cases, see, e.g., Barlow v. Roche, 161 A.2d 58, 63 n. l6 (D.C. 1960) 
(citing ScoTT ON TRUSTS § 187 (2d ed. 1956), whose sections correspond to the Restate-
ments), and in the ERISA cases. See, e.g., Firestone, !09 S. Ct. at 954. 
Plan administrators typically recognize only the first situation as the rule mandated by trust 
law, modify it to permit only de novo review, and reject or ignore the remainder. See Brief for 
Petitioner at 17, 19, Firestone (No. 87-1054). Thus a court must take care when evaluating 
their advocacy for trust law. 
166. Courts sometimes use the phrase "arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith" in trust law 
to refer to court review of the exercise of a trustee's discretion. See Town of Randolph v. 
Roberts, 346 Mass. 578, 580, 195 N.E.2d 72, 73 (1964). See also First Nat'! Bank of Md. v. 
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene, 284 Md. 720, 726, 399 A.2d 891, 896 (1979) ("arbi-
trary, dishonest or from an improper motive"). 
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tinguished which situation a particular phrase covered. 167 An attempt to 
determine which of these situations corresponds to the ERISA arbitrary and 
capricious rule, and hence the situations to which a court should limit its 
application, is not readily apparent solely by comparing phrases. 
For example, the ERISA arbitrary and capricious rule generally corre-
sponds to the situation where a standard to judge the trustee's action ex-
ists.168 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts explicitly equates unreasonable 
with arbitrary, 169 as do the trust170 and the LMRA cases.171 Capriciousness 
is generally considered the opposite of reasonableness.172 Cases applying 
trust law in this instance sometimes refuse de novo review; 173 however, the 
courts lack uniformity and some courts order a dismissal directing the 
trustee to exercise his reasonable judgment. 174 Some courts remand for the 
167. Cf G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560, at 199-201 
(1980) [hereinafter BoGERT]. 
168. The exact distinction between the words may be of no import because some courts 
view the phrases as being interchangeable in trust law. See, e.g., Fielding v. International 
Harvester, 815 F.2d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 1987) ("preserv[ing] the 'arbitrary and capricious' 
vocabulary"). See also BOGERT, supra note 167, § 560, at 199. 
169. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128 comment d (1959) with id. 
§ 187 comment e. 
170. Cases cited by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 and 3 W. FRATCHER, 
supra note 134, § 187.2, for overruling a trustee's discretionary act for failure to use reasonable 
judgment and label the decision as arbitrary action include: Funk v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 
127 (3d Cir. 1950) (trust); In re Clark, 174 Iowa 449, 451, 154 N.W. 759, 760 (1916) (will), 
reh'g denied, 174 Iowa 459, 156 N.W. 353 (1916); State v. Rubion, 158 Tex. 43, 52, 308 
S.W.2d 4, 9 (1957) (will). Compare Price v. Price, 341 Mass. 390, 393, 170 N.E.2d 346, 348 
(1960) (will); In re Shiel's Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 632, 636 (Surr. Ct. 1953) (will) with RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 comment e (1959). 
171. Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 287 (D.D.C. 1958). 
172. See Funk, 185 F.2d at 131 (trust) (substandard conduct would be unreasonable and a 
breach of trust where trust did not sanction caprice); Woodward v. Jalbert, 94 N.H. 324, 326, 
52 A.2d 641, 644 (1947) (citing§ 187) ("(p]rudence and reasonableness, not caprice or careless 
good nature . .. furnish the standard . . . . "); see also BOGERT, supra note 167, at 195 (no 
reason at all is arbitrary and capricious); Corkery v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, Ill N.E. 795 
(1916) (prudence and reasonableness, not caprice or carelessness); Garvey v. Garvey, 150 
Mass. 185, 22 ·N.E. 889 (1889) (trustee is to act on "good judgment" and not upon his mere 
will or caprice or from selfish or corrupt motives). 
173. See In reHeard's Estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d 225, 232, 236 P.2d 810, 816 (1951) (court 
will not substitute its judgment); Woodward v. Jalbert, 94 N.H. 324, 327, 52 A.2d 641 , 644 
(1947) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187) ("some manner of executing the 
trust which will comply [with the trust] should be determined upon by [the trustees] and 
submitted to the court if prudence dictates'); Shiel's Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 636 ("The court 
may not substitute its judgment for that of the trustees."); In re Hafemann's Will, 265 Wis. 
641, 646, 62 N.W.2d 561, 564 (1954) (asserting that when trustees fail to exercise a reasonable 
judgment, it is the court's duty to direct them to exercise their discretion properly). 
174. See, e.g., Hanford v. Clancy, 87 N.H. 458, 183 A. 271 (1936); In re Gruber's Will, 122 
N.Y.S.2d 654 (Surr. Ct. 1953), Manning v. Sheehan, 75 Misc. 374, 133 N.Y.S. 1006 (Surr. Ct. 
1912); In re Brown's Appeal, 345 Pa. 373, 380, 29 A.2d 52, 55 (1942). 
170 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 39:133 
trial court to hear evidence and exercise its supervisory powers;175 whereas 
other courts remand for the trial court to set boundaries within which the 
trustee must exercise his discretion. 176 Hence the absence of de novo review 
and the substantial evidence requirement of the ERISA arbitrary and capri-
cious rule did not derive from trust law but rather from the federal common 
law of employee benefit plans and the requirement applies when the ERISA 
arbitrary and capricious rule applies. 
Moreover, the bad faith addition to the arbitrary and capricious rule mir-
rors the dishonest trustee situation. A trustee with discretion engages in 
dishonesty when his decision benefits himself at the expense of the benefici-
ary.177 Thus, when an employer plan administrator of a welfare plan or 
defined benefit plan denies a benefit, the employer engages in self-dealing by 
reducing any future contribution and effectively taking money from the 
trust. 178 Some courts describe such self-dealing as acting in bad faith, 179 as 
175. See, e.g., In re Cool's Trusteeship, 210 Iowa 30, 33-34, 230 N.W. 353, 355 (1930); 
Schofield v. Commerce Trust Co., 319 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Kan. Ct. App. 1958); Gardner v. 
O'Loughlin, 76 N.H. 481 , 483, 84 A. 935, 936 (1912); Stallard v. Johnson, 189 Okla. 376, 379, 
116 P.2d 965, 967 (1941); In re Curtis' Trust Estate, 253 Wis. 119, 125-26, 33 N.W.2d 193, 197 
(1948). 
176. See, e.g., In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W.2d 148 (1943); Eaton v. Eaton, 82 
N.H. 216, 132 A. 10 (1926). 
177. Beatson v. Bowers, 174 Ind. 601 , 91 N.E. 922 (1910) (trustee received consideration to 
make payment to beneficiary); Keating v. Keating, 182 Iowa 1056, 165 N.W. 74 (1917) 
(trustee refused to convey land to beneficiary and wrote letter stating he might give it to his 
daughter); Butler v. Badger, 128 Minn. 99, 150 N.W. 233 (1914) (trustee accused of receiving a 
benefit for becoming a trustee); Oskner v. Jaco, 646 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) 
(alleged trustee-beneficiary refused to pay funeral expenses so his remainder would be greater); 
Gould v. Starr, 558 S.W.2d 755, 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (trustee received exorbitant selling 
commissions and legal fees), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); Turnure v. Turnure, 89 N.J . Eq. 
197, 201-02, 104 A. 293, 295 (1918) (no evidence that refusal to convey land to beneficiary was 
for a selfish motive); Metcalf v. Gladding, 35 R.I. 395, 87 A. 195 (1913) (upheld advances 
made to certain beneficiaries because the "trustee" received no benefit); In re Teasdale's Estate, 
261 Wis. 248, 253-54, 52 N.W.2d 366, 372 (1952) (trustees made evaluation to benefit one of 
the trustees); In re Smith, [1896] 1 Ch. 71 (trustee bribed to make trust investment). See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 (1959); 3 W. FRATCHER, supra note 134, § 187.4 
(stating the proposition that a court may reverse a trustee's discretionary act for dishonesty). 
The Restatement only gives bribery as an example of dishonesty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 187 comment f (1959). 
178. Some plan administrators try to disguise self-dealing under the conflict of interest 
rubric. See Brief for Petitioners at 28, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948 
(1989) (No. 87-1054); Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the National 
Association of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae at 17, Firestone (No. 87-1054) [hereinafter 
Amici Brief for Chamber of Commerce]; Brief for the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus 
Curiae at 11, Firestone (No. 87-1054) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for ERISA Industry]. See also 
Firestone, 109 S. Ct. at 956 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 comment d 
(1959) (conflict of interest is only a factor in determining self-interest)). 
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in the ERISA cases. 180 Hence the bad faith component that some of the 
circuits add to the ERISA arbitrary and capricious rule rests upon a portion 
of the trust law that allows the reversal of a trustee's discretionary decisions. 
Under trust law, a court, once it finds that the trustee acted dishonestly (or 
in bad faith), uses a de novo review of the discretionary decision and, if the 
court finds the decision incorrect, substitutes its own judgment for the deci-
sion that the court believes the trustee should have made. 181 
The third situation, involving trustee action having an improper, but not 
dishonest, motive does not correspond to any recognized addition to the ar-
bitrary and capricious rule. A trustee with discretion acts with an improper 
motive when furthering an interest other than that of the trust, 182 acts out of 
spite, 183 prejudice, 184 or self-interest (other than self-dealing).185 Acting 
179. Gould v. Starr, 558 S.W.2d 755, 765 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 
(1978); Turnure, 89 N.J. Eq. at 202, 104 A. at 295; Teasdale, 261 Wis. at 262, 52 N.W.2d at 
372. 
180. See, e.g. , Allen v. United Mine Workers 1979 Benefit Plan, 726 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
181. See, e.g., Elward v. Elward, 117 Kan. 458, 232 P. 240 (1924) (trustee-beneficiary re-
fused to increase allowance of his sister beneficiary); Collister v. Fassitt, 163 N.Y. 281, 57 N.E. 
490 (1900) (trustee-beneficiary refused to maintain beneficiary [husband's niece]); Matter of 
Allen, 192 Misc. 8, 82 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (trustee-beneficiary refused to maintain 
beneficiary [stepmother]). See also 3 W. FRA TCHER, supra note 134, § 187.1 (discussing meth-
ods by which a court may control a trustee who commits or threatens to commit a breach of 
trust). 
182. See, e.g., Home v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 79 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (trustee gave 
trust property to his second wife, not a beneficiary as was his first wife); Conway v. Emeny, 
139 Conn. 612, 96 A.2d 221 (1953) (trustees terminated trust for a museum to benefit contin-
gent beneficiary, a school); In re Roth's Will, 154 Misc. 5, 276 N.Y.S. 435 (Surr. Ct. 1934) 
(trustee refused payment to niece for bad morals to reinter settlor, the brother, and father), 
a./f'd, 244 App. Div. 791, 280 N.Y.S. 967 (1935); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS§ 187 comment g (1959). 
183. In re Koretzky, 8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951) (animosity between trustee and benefi-
ciary); Buchar's Estate, 225 Pa. 427, 74 A. 237 (1909) (hostility between brothers, one a 
trustee-beneficiary, the other a beneficiary); Klug v. Klug, [1918] 2 Ch. 67 (trustee refused 
advances to beneficiary who married without trustee consent); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 187 comment g (1959). 
184. Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300, 321 (1888) (trustee-beneficiary claimed there was no 
trust and denied benefits to mother and sister of settlor, the trustee's husband-hatred of in-
laws); McDonald v. McDonald, 92 Ala. 537, 9 So. 195 (1890) (trustee beneficiary refused to 
use income to support his adult children-pater fami/ias) ; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS§ 187 comment g (1959). 
185. Sauvage v. Gallaway, 331 Ill. App. 309, 73 N.E.2d 133 (1947) (trustee tried to sell 
trust asset used in competing against his business); Norcum v. D'Oench, 17 Mo. 98 (1852) 
(trustee refused sale of land as it would be used as a graveyard adjacent to his land); Matter of 
Ahrens, 275 A.D.2d 588, 91 N.Y.S.2d 412 (App. Div. 1949) (trustees terminated trust, a 
shareholder, upon beneficiary signing liability release to avoid suing selves for corporate mis-
deeds thus cutting off contingent beneficiaries), rev'd on the facts, 301 N.Y. 701 , 95 N.E.2d 53 
(1950); see a/so RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 comment g (1959). 
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with an improper motive, however, generally does not involve bad faith. 186 
But again, under trust law, if a court finds that the trustee acted with an 
improper motive, it will substitute its own judgment for the decision the 
trustee should have made if that decision was incorrect. 187 A court will con-
sider conflicts of interest when reviewing improper motives. 188 
The last situation, where the trustee fails to act, should cause no concern 
under ERISA because ERISA provides a procedure to compel action on a 
claim and the associated plan interpretation. 189 
Thus, the trust law that applies to judicial review of a plan administrator's 
discretionary decisions under ERISA provides for three situations: (1) when 
the plan administrator is properly motivated; (2) when the plan administra-
tor's decision involves self-dealing; and (3) when the plan administrator's 
decision involves an improper motive other than self-dealing. The latter two 
instances generally constitute prohibited transactions (i.e., actions deemed 
imprudent per se190 under ERISA) 191 and make the plan administrator lia-
ble to the plan for any damage suffered by the plan. 192 However, in the 
claim denial and plan interpretation situations, while the plan suffers no 
damage, the employee/beneficiary does. Thus, the employee/beneficiary 
must enforce violations of fiduciary duties in these two instances. 193 How-
ever, the question is not whether ERISA prohibited the decision, since ER-
ISA permits employers and their representatives to be plan administrators 
without violating the prohibited transaction requirement, 194 but what stan-
dard of review governs a court reviewing the discretionary action in these 
situations. 
186. In re Koretzky, 8 N.J. 506, 86 A.2d 238 (1951); see also 3 W. FRATCHER, supra note 
134, § 187.5 (discussing improper motive). The ERISA cases do appear to equate "bad faith" 
with improper motive-usually animosity. See, e.g., Denton v. First Nat'! Bank, 765 F.2d 
1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1985) (hostility). 
187. Colton, 127 U.S. at 321. 
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 comment g (1959). 
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1988). 
190. See McDougall v. Donovan, 552 F. Supp. 1206, 1215-16 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 
191. 29 u.s.c. § 1106(b) (1982). 
192. Id. §§ 1109,1132. 
193. Id. § 1132(1)(B). See Fine v. Semet, 514 F. Supp. 34 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (denial of lump-
sum payout by major participants acting as plan administrators alleged to be self-dealing in 
violation of prohibited transaction rule, plaintiffs lost under arbitrary and capricious rule), 
aff'd, 699 F.2d 1091 (lith Cir. 1983); Flinchbaugh v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 531 F. 
Supp. 110 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (deduction of severance pay from benefit by corporate officers 
acting as plan administrators alleged to be conflict of interest in violation of prohibited transac-
tion rule, plaintiffs lost under arbitrary and capricious rule). 
194. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)(A)(ii), 1108(c)(3); Flinchbaugh, 531 F. Supp. at 113. 
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2. When to Use the Arbitrary and Capricious Rule 
Under trust law, the arbitrary and capricious rule clearly does not apply 
to the last two of the three situations. In the first situation, for an employee 
benefit plan, the arbitrary and capricious rule should apply to the disinter-
ested plan administrator and not to the interested plan administrator, re-
gardless of the propriety of his motive. The following reasons mandate this 
conclusion. In applying this trust law to ERISA plans, courts must follow 
the congressional directive to consider the special characteristics of em-
ployee plans. 195 These characteristics are manifested through three major 
differences between the typical trust and the employee benefit plan: (1) an 
employee benefit plan settlor generally will continue to make future contri-
butions to the trust196 and hence has a desire to reduce the amount of those 
future contributions; (2) the contribution does not represent a gift of the 
settlor's property to the beneficiary, 197 but represents the employee/benefici-
ary's deferred compensation and property; 198 and (3) the claim denial deci-
sion for review by the court is the second decision of a two-tiered process in 
which the plan administrator has reviewed its own initial denial and seeks to 
justify its prior determination in a nonneutral fashion. 199 
The first difference pertains to the self-dealing situation to which the arbi-
trary and capricious rule does not apply. Although ERISA prohibits direct 
195. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
196. Most employee benefit plans are long-term programs. The Internal Revenue Service 
requires retirement plans to be permanent, as distinguished from temporary programs. 26 
C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1989). However, some plans may be one-time affairs, such as a sever-
ance pay plan for a sold subsidiary. 
197. Some employers create employee benefit plans pursuant to a contractual obligation 
between the employer and the beneficiary. See, e.g., Melin v. N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 266 N.W.2d 
183, 186 (Minn. 1978). 
198. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1003-07 (deferred compensation theory). 
The parties create welfare plans to provide the benefits with pretax dollars. The employer 
may deduct the payment and the employee receives no taxable benefit. I.R.C. §§ 106, 125, 419 
(1988). In the alternative, the employer could pay the money to the employee and have the 
employee buy the benefit from an insurance company or other service provider. However, 
those benefits would be less because the employee receives no deduction from his taxes for the 
payment. /d. § 61. 
The parties create retirement plans to provide for tax free build-up of moneys before the 
employee must pay tax on this portion of his income. The employer may also deduct the 
contribution and the benefit is not taxed until received by the employee years later. /d. §§ 402, 
404. In the alternative, the employer could pay the employee immediately, let him pay tax on 
the amount, id. § 61 , and invest the remainder, paying tax on the income. /d. § 61. The result 
would be a smaller "nest egg" at retirement. 
199. See Thomas, Due Process, Hearings, and Pension and Welfare Plan Claim Denials 
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 LAB. L.J. 276, 285 (1977) 
(advocating a due process hearing at the plan administrator level [now permitted but not re-
quired, 29 C.F.R . § 2560.503-1(h) (1987)] or de novo review at the trial level). 
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and indirect transactions between plan administrators200 and the plan, and 
permits employers to serve as the plan administrators without violating these 
prohibitions, 201 effective self-dealing will also arise if the employer/plan ad-
ministrator denies claims for welfare plans and defined benefit plans, thereby 
reducing the employer's future contributions. Any such denial, although 
perhaps not egregious, amounts to employer self-dealing, because the em-
ployer benefits from the plan. 
Realization of the inherent employer self-dealing if the employer serves as 
the plan administrator, recognition that the funds belong to the employee/ 
beneficiary202 (residing in the employee benefit plan trust solely to escape 
federal tax), and recognition of the bias in plan administrators' final deci-
sions, certainly demand the distinction between the interested and disinter-
ested plan administrator for employee benefit plans to a greater extent than 
is normally recognized in trust law. 
Hence, courts should divide the first category for review into two subcat-
egories: the first portion for the interested plan administrator anchhe second 
portion for the disinterested plan administrator. The ERISA arbitrary and 
capricious rule, with its absence of de novo review and substantial evidence 
requirements, clearly applies only to this latter category: the case of the dis-
interested plan administrator with proper motives. In all other cases, specifi-
cally the case of the interested plan administrator with proper motives, the 
case of demonstrated or actual self-dealing, and the case of demonstrated 
improper motive other than self-dealing, the court should use de novo 
review. 
3. Application of the Proper Rule to Typical Plan Administrators 
The spectrum of potential plan administrators runs from the employer 
serving as the plan administrator203 to the equally balanced LMRA plan 
administrator.204 Congress did not intend, nor is it wise, to treat all types of 
plan administrators equally. Clearly the employer serving as a plan adminis-
trator functions as an interested plan administrator to which the de novo 
review rule should apply. The LMRA plan administrator, however, is disin-
200. 29 u.s.c. § 1106 (1982). 
201. Id. §§ 1002(16)(A)(ii), 1108(c)(3). 
202. ERISA requires the employer to relinquish ownership of the contributions. Id. 
§ 1103(c)(1). 
203. ERISA permits this practice. /d. §§ 1002(16)(A)(ii), 1108(c)(3). 
204. These are the two extremes noted by the Third Circuit in breaking with the past. 
Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144 (3d Cir. 1987) ("The plan is con-
trolled entirely by the employer, not by a group evenly divided between employer and employ-
ees."), a.ff'd in part and rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989). 
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terested,205 and, therefore, the arbitrary and capricious rule should apply. 206 
Between these two extremes, the common arrangements for a plan adminis-
trator involve a committee of high management officials, 207 a committee of 
employees, 208 and service providers. 209 Because of actual conflicts of inter-
est that high management employees have as plan administrators between 
their duty of loyalty to the corporation as managers and their duty of loyalty 
to the plan as fiduciaries, the court should conclusively presume them inter-
ested plan administrators210 to which de novo review applies. 
A court should also deem the committee of employees and the service 
provider interested upon a showing of that interest. For example, the plan 
may have formally or informally tied the plan administrator's yearly com-
pensation to the frequency of benefit denials211 or the employer may have 
explicitly stated tha.: the plan administrator would not keep the job if the 
plan paid out too many benefits. 2 12 Thus, courts should review the plan 
administrator's decision on a de novo basis when the employer or a commit-
tee of management employees serve as the plan administrator or when the 
employee/beneficiary has discharged the burden of proof of showing that 
another type of plan administrator has engaged in self-dealing or acted with 
an improper motive. 
205. Congress created the disinterested LMRA plan administrator with no thought of what 
review rule would apply, but rather to prevent union abuses in asset management. United 
Mine Workers Health & Retirement Funds v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562, 571-72 (1982); NLRB 
v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322,330 n.13 (1981); Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425-
26 (1959). Regardless of the reason for the arrangement, once made, trust law determines the 
review rule on the basis of that disinterested arrangement. 
206. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
207. See supra note 22. 
208. See id. 
209. Cf Schulist v. Blue Cross, 553 F. Supp. 248, 252 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 717 F.2d 1127 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (service provider must have authority to review denied claims); Eversole v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (same); Austin v. General Am. Life 
Ins. Co., 498 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (same). 
210. This conflict, as it applies to investment decisions by plan trustees, has caused one 
commentator to suggest repeal of the exception from prohibited transactions for certain acts of 
corporate officers contained in ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § ll08 (c)(3) (1982). Note, Conflicts of 
Interest Arising Under ERISA's Fiduciary Standards: Can the Trustee Ever Be Prudent, As 
Long As He Faces Dual Loyalties?, 9 NovA L.J. 413 (1985). 
211. See Amici Brief for Chamber of Commerce, supra note 178, at 29; cf NLRB v. Ohio 
New & Rebuilt Parts, Inc. , 760 F.2d 1443, 1448 (6th Cir.) ("substantial personal, financial and 
other irrelevant and impermissible interests"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985); Tumey v. 
Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (criminal trial before a judge with direct personal interest in con-
victing defendant is a denial of due process rights). 
212. See Amici Brief for Chamber of Commerce, supra note 178, at 29 n.35. 
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B. Prior Case Law Approach 
Two other approaches lead to the conclusion that de novo review should 
apply, although the Supreme Court has disparaged them. In Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 213 the Supreme Court recognized an additional con-
gressional intention in passing ERISA: the intent to incorporate much of 
the LMRA fiduciary law into ERISA.214 Plan administrators contend this 
means the arbitrary and capricious rule.215 However, the history of the 
adoption of the LMRA rule indicates that the courts adopted the trust rule 
contained in the Restatement of Trusts.216 
In determining the validity of the plan administrators' contention, clearly 
a precedent case has both a maximum holding and a minimum holding.217 
The minimum holding of the first LMRA circuit court opinion218 would be 
the arbitrary and capricious rule with its deferential, narrow review.219 An 
LMRA plan has disinterested plan administrators, and therefore the arbi-
trary and capricious rule generally would apply. The maximum holding 
would be the full review rule of the Restatement of Trusts. 220 The LMRA 
cases, however, generally do not involve self-dealing (with an evenly bal-
anced plan administrator): hence large portions of the full trust rule would 
not apply to the LMRA plans. Thus, the LMRA rule incorporated into 
213. 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989). 
214. The Supreme Court once suggested that ERISA codified the fiduciary standards of the 
LMRA. NRLB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 333 (1981) ("ERISA essentially codified the 
strict fiduciary standards that . . . [LMRA] trustee must meet."); see also Firestone, 109 S. Ct. 
at 953. However, the citations supplied by the Court (29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(2) (1982); H.R. 
CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 6, at 296, 307, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS at 5076-77, 5088) do not support this proposition. 
215. Firestone, 109 S. Ct. at 953. 
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 (1959). See Ruth v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 
346 (D.D.C. 1958) (noncharitable trust rule); Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282 (D.D.C. 1958) 
(the charitable trust rule); Barlow v. Roche, 161 A.2d 58, 63 n.16 (D.C. 1960) (citing ScoTT 
ON TRUSTS§ 187 (2d ed. 1956)). See also supra notes 132-52 and accompanying text. 
217. K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 69 (1960). 
218. Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962); see supra notes 148-52 and accompa-
nying text. 
219. The District of Columbia Circuit followed this approach because that circuit fre-
quently cites the LMRA rule as "arbitrary or capricious." See, e.g., Norton v. I.A.M. Nat'! 
Pension Fund, 553 F.2d 1352, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Pete v. United Mine Workers Welfare & 
Retirement Fund, 517 F.2d 1275, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Roark v. Boyle, 439 F.2d 497, 499 
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Gaydosh v. Lewis, 410 F.2d 262, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Roark v. Lewis, 401 
F.2d 425, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Kosty v. Lewis, 319 F.2d 744, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied, 375 U.S. 964 (1964). 
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959). Several circuit courts followed 
this approach as a result of adding bad faith or other elements to the arbitrary and capricious 
rule. See, e.g., Beam v. International Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, 511 F.2d 975, 980 (2d 
Cir. 1975); Brune v. Morse, 475 F.2d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 1973) (citing section 187); Danti, 312 
F.2d at 348. 
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ERISA by Congress represents the full trust rule because Congress did not 
intend to adopt an attenuated arbitrary and capricious rule in light of the 
purposes of ERISA to benefit employee/beneficiaries. 221 
Further, congressional debates made clear one of the implicit directives: 
that the courts were to develop the federal common law of employee benefit 
plans by considering their special characteristics, 222 and the various methods 
of selecting the plan administrator is one of those characteristics. 223 The 
LMRA cases did not contain this factor. The Supreme Court, however, dis-
favors this approach,224 mistakenly indicating (1) that the courts adopted 
the arbitrary and capricious rule for the LMRA cases to assert federal juris-
diction to review the decision because the LMRA did not provide for suits 
against plan administrators by employee beneficiaries for erroneous deci-
sions225 and (2) that reason does not apply to ERISA, which specifically 
provides for such suits. 226 
C. Statutory Standard Approach 
Another approach involves recognition of the proposition227 that the 
LMRA standard of behavior for the plan administrator differs significantly 
from the ERISA mandate, namely the prudent man standard with similar 
221. See supra note 37. 
222. See supra note 154. 
223. The Conference Report states: 
A named fiduciary may be a person whose name actually appears in the document, 
or may be a person who holds an office specified in the document, such as the com-
pany president. A named fiduciary also may be a person who is identified by the 
employer or union, under a procedure set out in the document. For example, the 
plan may provide that the employer's board of directors is to choose the person who 
manages or controls the plan. In addition, a named fiduciary may be a person identi-
fied by the employers and union acting jointly. For example, the members of a joint 
board of trustees of a Taft-Hartley plan would usually be named fiduciaries. 
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 6, at 297, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 5078. 
224. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 953-54 (1989). 
225. Legal history does not support this position. The question of jurisdiction and the use 
of the arbitrary and capricious rule to supply jurisdiction did not arise until the late 1960s (at 
the circuit court level in 1962), after the adoption of the arbitrary and capricious rule for the 
review of plan administrator discretionary decisions in the LMRA plans, primarily because the 
plan administrators conceded jurisdiction. See Welch & Wilson, Applicability of Traditional 
Principles of Trust Law to Union and Management Representatives Administering Taft-Hartley 
Trusts, 23 LAB. L.J. 671, 675 (1972); Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Laws of Welfare and 
Pension Plans, 55 CoRNELL L. REV. 911, 927 (1970), see also Comment, supra note 35, at 
1037-39; Comment, supra note 10, at 992-93. 
226. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132 (1988). 
227. See E. LEVI, supra note 88, at 2 ("[Rule change] depends upon a determination of 
what facts will be considered similar to those present when the rule was first announced. The 
finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process."). 
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duties and in similar circumstances, 228 which applies to all fiduciary actions, 
not just those involving investments.229 Court review of a plan administra-
tor's action should involve the question of whether the plan administrator 
satisfied the statutory standard. The statutory standard requires identifica-
tion of a fiduciary in similar circumstances to the plan administrator. 
Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts should apply to the 
discretionary decisions of the plan administrator under the prudent man 
rule. 230 An employee benefit plan often corresponds to a trust, 231 especially 
in light of the congressional statements concerning the applicability of trust 
law to these plans. 232 The plan administrator clearly corresponds to the 
trustee of a trust. The Supreme Court, however, has mistakenly disparaged 
this approach by stating that ERISA does not provide an appropriate stan-
dard of judicial review.233 Moreover, future courts must distinguish or over-
rule the past failures of courts to recognize the prudent man rule in these 
cases of discretionary actions. 
D. Rule for Plan Interpretation 
The remaining question concerns the applicable rule for court review of a 
plan administrator's discretionary power to interpret the plan. As shown 
above, trust law generally applies to ERISA plans. 234 Trust law provides 
228. See supra note 9. 
229. See, e.g., Comment, Investment of Qualified Pension Fund Assets and Fiduciary Re-
sponsibilities Under ERISA, 12 W. ST. U.L. REV. 267, 272 (1984); Comment, supra note 10, at 
1001. 
230. A few circuit courts have recognized that the prudent man standard applies to the 
plan administrator's discretionary decisions. See Witmeyer v. Kilroy, 788 F.2d 1021, 1025 
(4th Cir. 1986) (trustees acted in a reasonable and prudent manner); Struble v. New Jersey 
Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 334 (3d Cir. 1984) (providing that the 
decision affects a class and not just one individual); Pierce v. NECA-IBEW Welfare Trust 
Fund, 620 F.2d 589, 591 (6th Cir.) (trustee's actions upheld under arbitrary and capricious 
rule for the LMRA and prudent man rule for ERISA), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015 (1980). 
231. Some welfare plans have no formal trust, relying entirely upon the general assets of 
the employer. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 951 (1989). 
232. The House Report expressly highlighted the relationship: 
The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these 
fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts. The 
section was deemed necessary for several reasons. First, a number of plans are struc-
tured in such a way that it is unclear whether the traditional law of trusts is 
applicable. 
H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 30, at 11-12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS at 4649-50. 
233. Firestone, 109 S. Ct. at 953 (citing two circuit court opinions expressing doubt as to 
the circumstances under which different standards apply). This may merely mean that an-
other logical step is needed, such as the one proposed here. 
234. See supra notes 162-94 and accompanying text. 
1989] ERISA 179 
that the court, not the trustee, interprets the trust's terms, 235 even when the 
trustee possesses interpretive discretion.236 Usually, the rules of trust con-
struction, as with deeds and wills, dictate that the courts construe the trusts 
in favor of the conveyancer/settlor's intent. 237 This is appropriate when the 
trustee has no interpretive discretion. However, when the trustee does pos-
sess that discretion, trust law requires a court to review the decision under 
the "abuse of discretion" standard used for other discretionary actions. 238 
This means that a court will use de novo review for the interested employer 
plan administrator, tending to construe the plan's terms against the em-
ployer, as courts did under the pre-ERISA state decisions favorably com-
mented upon by the Supreme Court. 239 A court using the prudent man rule 
would reach a similar result. Welfare plans often resemble insurance con-
tracts in which the court construes the terms against the draftsman. 240 
Hence, a prudent plan administrator should similarly interpret the welfare 
plan as if it were an insurance contract.241 
VI. IMPACT OF THE PROPER RULE 
A. Structuring the Plan Administrator to Avoid the Problem 
The impact on employee benefit plans of implementing the proper rule for 
court review of discretionary plan administrator decisions will depend on the 
plan administrator's structure. For union-negotiated plans, numerous unre-
lated employers typically serve as the settlors or source of plan contribu-
tions. Under the LMRA, these plans have balanced and thus disinterested 
plan administrators. 242 
235. 3 W. FRATCHER, supra note 134, § 201; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 201 comment b (1959) (trustee is in breach of his fiduciary duty when he interprets the trust 
as authorizing him to do acts that a court determines he is not authorized to do). 
236. Taylor v. McClave, 128 N.J. Eq. 109, 15 A.2d 213 (1940). 
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 4 (1959). 
238. See Taylor, 128 N.J. Eq. at 112, 15 A.2d at 215 (using a reasonable test for a disinter-
ested trustee); BOGERT, supra note 167, at 169-71. 
239. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 956 (1989) ("Adopting Fire-
stone's reading of ERISA would require us to impose a standard of review that would afford 
less protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was 
enacted."). 
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 206 comment b (1982). 
241. Unfortunately, plan administrators are not as ethical as one would hope and instead 
have urged that the ERISA construction rule not only differs from the standard in similar 
circumstances (the prudent man rule) but favors the plan administrator. See Torimino v. 
United Food & Commercial Workers, 548 F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 882 
(8th Cir. 1983); see also Mandel, supra note 36, at 457-66 (suggesting that insurance companies 
convert state insurance contracts cases into federal ERISA claims to avoid state construction 
rules and bad faith insurance claims lawsuits [a most unethical suggestion]). 
242. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). 
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Non-union-negotiated plans typically have one employer or a related em-
ployer group as the settlor. These plans typically specify the employer, a 
committee of management employees, or occasionally a service provider as 
the plan administrator. The ability of non-union-negotiated plans to estab-
lish disinterested plan administrators may be difficult because many plans 
reserve to the employer the right to appoint plan administrators.243 Legisla-
tive history suggests that those who appoint fiduciaries are themselves fiduci-
aries. 244 Thus, the employer, acting through its board245 in selecting a 
committee of management employees, a committee of rank and file employ-
ees, or a service provider will create a conflict of interest between the plan 
administrator (their continued employment) and the employee/beneficiaries. 
A court must take into account this conflict when determining whether the 
plan administrators acted with an improper motive by furthering the interest 
of the employer, also a fiduciary, in denying a claim. 
Appointing a service provider as plan administrator may not completely 
reduce the possibility of de novo review. Some insurance companies assume 
the risk of a fully-insured welfare plan for a fee. 246 The more claims pay-
ments are made from the pool of contributions, the smaller the insurance 
company's profits on servicing the plan. A claim denial would then amount 
to self-dealing, and in subsequent litigation a court would subject the risk-
assuming service provider to the same review as the employer serving as plan 
administrator. 
Non-union-negotiated plans fall into two different groups: those created 
by large companies in which management views the company as a welfare 
state and generally concerns itself with the employees' welfare; and those 
created by small companies in which an entrepreneurial management re-
gards the plan's assets as belonging to it and not the rank and file employees, 
whom employers included in the plan only to meet coverage require-
ments.247 Only this latter group of employee benefit plans are likely to expe-
rience any problems avoiding de novo review. 
243. See Grogan, Fiduciary Responsibility Under ERISA, 54 TAXES 961 , 962, 967-68 
(1976). 
244. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, supra note 6, at 323 ("Under this definition, fiduciaries 
include officers and directors of a plan, members of a plan's investment committee and persons 
who select these individuals."), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5103 . 
245. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 3d§ 8.01 (Supp. 1989). 
246. Brief for the American Council of Life Insurance and Health Insurance Association of 
America as Amicus Curiae at 9, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948 (1989) 
(No. 87-1054) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Insurance Council]. 
247. I.R.C. § 410 (1988). 
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B. No Increased Litigation 
Plan administrators fear that de novo review of their discretionary deci-
sions will increase litigation. 248 De novo review also consumes judicial re-
sources expended in reviewing routine plan administrator decisions that 
courts would not review under the arbitrary and capricious rule. 249 This 
fear assumes that disappointed claimants will sue more frequently, because 
de novo review, which is not as deferential to the plan administrator as the 
arbitrary and capricious rule, would increase the chances of the employee/ 
beneficiary winning. However, ERISA's object was not to reduce litigation 
but to provide remedies for employee/beneficiaries. 250 
Moreover, the increased cost of de novo review burdens the employee/ 
beneficiary as well and may even deter litigation by disappointed employee/ 
beneficiaries.251 Even if the number of lawsuits did not increase, the time 
spent on each case could rise. 252 However, under the proper review rule for 
plan administrator discretionary decisions, the disappointed claimant could 
only use de novo review if either the plan administrator was the employer, a 
committee of management employees, or a risk-assuming service provider; 
or the claimant satisfied the burden of proof on the plan administrator's self-
dealing or some other improper motive. 253 Because the denying or granting 
of single claims involves amounts too small to require impartiality among a 
committee of employees or a non-risk-assuming service provider serving as 
plan administrator/54 self-dealing will not be very common (or apparent) 
except when a plan administrator denies many claims. 255 
The plan sponsor could greatly reduce the possibility of de novo review in 
these situations by providing that the plan administrator is someone other 
than the employer, a committee of management, or a risk-assuming service 
provider, such as a committee of nonmanagement employees, a committee 
248. Firestone, 109 S. Ct. at 956. 
249. Amicus Brief for ERISA Industry, supra note 178, at 12. 
250. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 30, at 12 ("[E]ven assuming that the law of trusts is 
applicable, without detailed information about the plan, access to the courts, and without stan-
dards by which a participant can measure the fiduciary's conduct he is not equipped to safe-
guard either his own rights or the plan assets."), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 4650. 
251. See Thomas, supra note 199, at 286. 
252. For this reason, courts adopted the absence of de novo review for LMRA cases. Ruth 
v. Lewis, 166 F. Supp. 346, 349 (D.D.C. 1958). 
253. See, e.g., Mesler v. Holly, 318 So. 2d 530, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
254. See Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1051 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
255. The employee/beneficiary presented this type of case in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 951 (1989), where the employer denied severance pay to a whole class 
of employees, those of a sold subdivision. 
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selected by a process similar to that for LMRA plans, or some disinterested 
outsider, such as an insurance company or some other service provider. The 
plan administrators could reduce the likelihood of de novo review if they 
changed their approach from following management's desires and subse-
quently justifying their decision, to deciding in a fair manner initially. The 
paucity of ERISA cases dealing with a plan administrator's improper mo-
tive256 suggests that employee/beneficiaries will have difficulty proving im-
proper motive. Hence, under the proper rule for reviewing a plan 
administrator's discretionary decision, litigation should not increase signifi-
cantly due to the small likelihood of future situations involving improper 
motives due to plan administrator restructuring as well as the difficulty of 
proving improper motives. 
C No Increased Administrative Costs 
Plan administrators also fear that de novo review will increase administra-
tive costs due to litigation and will discourage employers from adopting em-
ployee benefit plans. 257 The plan, and, except for defined contribution plans, 
the employer, through future contributions, generally will bear the expense 
of litigation against plan administrators who successfully defend the ac-
tion.258 Additionally, employers may pay judgments rendered against plan 
administrators259 and often undertake to do so to encourage persons to serve 
in these capacities. Nonetheless, increased cost should not present serious 
problems because the disappointed claimant could only use de novo review if 
(1) the plan administrator was the employer, a committee of management 
employees, or a risk-assuming service provider, or (2) the claimant satisfied 
the burden of proof on the basis of the plan administrator's self-dealing or 
some other improper motive. 
Moreover, trial courts may award attorney's fees and costs of the ac-
tion, 260 thus, disappointed claimants are not likely to bring suit without 
some legitimate ground for believing the plan administrator wrongfully took 
the action. If employees do litigate, the court will have a mechanism for 
discouraging frivolous lawsuits. Plan administrators, on their own initiative, 
could reduce this problem by making the correct, ethical decision rather 
256. Cf Denton v. First Nat') Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1985) (trial court did 
not find improper motive on the basis of officer's testimony when alleged benefits denied due to 
hostility). 
257. Amicus Brief for Insurance Council, supra note 246, at 10-11. 
258. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(2) (1982) (permitting reimbursement of expenses properly 
and actually incurred). 
259. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (1987). Such provisions require careful drafting to avoid 
ERISA prohibitions against similar provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 1110. 
260. 29 u.s.c. § 1132(g) (1982). 
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than following the current practice of doing what the employer desires, find-
ing a reasonable justification, and hiding behind the arbitrary and capricious 
rule. Employers presented similar arguments based on the administrative 
burden on employee benefit plans of amending plans for compliance and 
annual reporting when Congress first passed ERISA,261 yet plans 
increased. 262 
D. Role of Potential Conflict 
The possibility that the mere existence of a conflict of interest will trigger 
de novo review also concerns plan administrators. 263 Plan administrators 
have basked in the absence of de novo review under the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule for so long they have neglected to consider the significance of 
conflict of interest in court review of discretionary decisions. Under the 
proper rule and trust law, a court considers conflict of interest as only one 
factor among many to determine an improper motive other than self-deal-
ing. 264 Self-dealing clearly presents conflict of interest problems. However, 
the offense that triggers de novo review is not the conflict of interest's exist-
ence but self-dealing or improper motive, neither of which merits the ab-
sence of de novo review. Hence, a plan sponsor, wishing to avoid de novo 
review, should structure the plan administrator to remove the possibility of 
self-dealing. 
The most obvious solution would be a neutral plan administrator similar 
to those found under the LMRA structure to which the arbitrary and capri-
cious rule generally would apply. Such a structure would concern only those 
large employers who want to maintain veto power over multi-million dollar 
benefits caused by their own poor draftsmanship265 and those small employ-
ers who would like to maintain employer control of their employees' lives as 
much as possible. Those companies that desire to maintain such control 
must weigh that desire against the possibility of subjecting their plans' ad-
ministrator to de novo review. 
261. See, e.g., Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies 
and Problems, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539, 555, 627-28 (1975) (compliance with governmental 
requirements could result in lower pension benefit levels); Comment, Attorney's Liability 
Under ERISA, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 129, 153-54 (1979) (administrative costs have financially 
threatened some plans). 
262. Lilly, The Employee Retirement Inc~me Security Act, 35 LAB. L.J. 603, 604 (1984) 
(from 340,000 plans in 1975 to 775,000 in 1983). 
263. See, e.g., Amicus Brief for ERISA Industry, supra note 178, at 10. 
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS§ 187 comment g (1959). 
265. This was the situation in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 109 S. Ct. 948, 951 
(1989). 
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Whether the conflict of interest the court considers is actual conflict or 
potential conflict also concerns plan administrators. 266 A fiduciary has a 
potential conflict of interest when he has a relationship with a nonbeneficiary 
that might cause a breach of duty to the beneficiary.267 A potential conflict 
matures into an actual conflict if the fiduciary actually permits the relation-
ship to influence his decision or if he has inconsistent duties to a beneficiary 
and a non beneficiary. 268 
Self-dealing clearly constitutes actual conflict,269 as does having a commit-
tee of management employees serving as plan administrator. Hence the po-
tential conflict problem will arise, not when the plan administrator is the 
employer (self-dealing) or a committee of management employees (actual 
conflict), but when the plan administrator has some relationship with the 
employer such as a committee of employees serving as plan administrator or 
a service provider serving as plan administrator by contract with the em-
ployer. However, because the conflict of interest is but a single factor for 
determining improper motive, it alone should not trigger de novo review, 
and hence whether the conflict amounts to potential or actual should not 
concern the employer. 
What remains important, though, is whether conflict, actual or potential, 
such as spite, prejudice, or self-interest (other than self-dealing), caused the 
improper motive. Self-interest would be present if the plan administrator 
was a service provider who tied his income to the frequency of benefit deni-
als, formally by contract or informally by understanding, 270 or who knew 
prior plan administrators had been fired for paying out too much in benefits. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The courts should review the discretionary decisions of plan administra-
tors under the arbitrary and capricious standard only when dealing with 
disinterested plan administrators with proper motives. They should require 
de novo review in all other situations. Those other situations include: (I) an 
interested plan administrator, such as the employer, a committee of manage-
266. Amici Brief for Chamber of Commerce, supra note 178, at 16-17 ("Potential conflict 
of interest on ERISA plan does not alter standard of review."). 
267. See, e.g. , American Cancer Soc'y v. Hamerstein, 631 S.W.2d 858, 863 (Mo. 1981) 
(conflicts of interest between the trustee and beneficiary are considered in determining whether 
the trustees' actions were improperly motivated). 
268. See, e.g., Childs v. National Bank, 658 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1981) (trustees must act 
with the highest degree of loyalty toward beneficiaries). 
269. Goldman v. Rubin, 292 Md. 693, 705-06, 441 A.2d 713, 720 (1982). 
270. Cf Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1926); NLRB v. Ohio New & Rebuilt Parts, 
Inc., 760 F.2d 1443, 1448-49 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985). See also supra note 
211 and accompanying text. 
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ment employees, or a risk-assuming service provider; and (2) the employee/ 
beneficiary satisfying his burden of proof that the plan administrator en-
gaged in actual self-dealing or acted with an improper motive. This review 
standard will not cause difficulties so long as the plan sponsors, in structur-
ing the plan, and the plan administrator, in making decisions regarding ben-
efits, remember the words of Chief Justice Cardozo on fiduciary 
responsibilities: "Not honesty alone but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive is . . . the standard of behavior."271 
271. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 544, 545 (1928). 
